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EDITORIAL NOTES

Celebrating Journey through the Decade

We are feeling great satisfaction that the Journal of Economic & Commerce (JEC) is successfully completing the tenth year of publication. We are proud of our Editorial Board for the *Journal of Economics & Commerce (JEC)*, **Which** includes academicians in the fields of Economics and Commerce, who have marks of records of accomplishment in their respective disciplines and also share a burden of referee as per required from time to time. Ever since its inaugural publication in 2010, **JEC** has emerged as one of the most respected publications, encompassing both Economics and Commerce. We intend to build on this tradition with our present issue.

Over the years, **JEC** has endowed with a platform for the progression of knowledge and the quest of academic excellence. Many prominent scholars from different part of India have published inspiring high quality articles analogous to those in leading journals in the field. Even as maintaining its focus on contemporary developments in the broad areas of Economics and Commerce, the journal is now also pledged to the spreading out of research frontiers further.

Within this orientation the present issue of the journal provides a set of eight articles, which includes some special articles and case studies on burning issues of economics and commerce along with two proceedings of the International workshop organized by jointly DAV PG College and University of Manchester, UK, for the benefit of the students and faculty. In addition to this we have also kept our commitment towards promotion of new contributors and young researchers in the present issue. There is one special review article which shows the journey through the decade.

As the last words, we would like to tell our respected readers that our forthcoming issues intend to focus for theoretical, applied, and methodological work, with emphasis on development of critical issues with the use of empirical evidences, and the edifice policy measures. The Editors welcome submissions in this spirit on vital issues concerning our economy and commerce, **with a token of note that these will strictly be referred before acceptance.** We congratulate each member of the editorial team, advisors, contributors and well wishers for the successfully completing of the tenth year of our 'Journal of Economics and Commerce'.

The journey will continue

July - 2019

Anup Kumar Mishra
Managing Editor

Exclusive Reviewed Article

Journey through the Decade of Journal of Economics and Commerce: Review of the Best papers published during 2010-2019

Anup K Mishra*

MY WORDS

Aristotle famously argued that time is the measure of change. To test this thesis, I recalled out few articles during the 10 year journey which has been published in our “Journal of Economics and Commerce” under my managing editorship. Then I felt excited. Wow. Ten years. It's been an incredible ride. Through the ups and downs (and there have been plenty of both), there haven't been many constants in my life during the publication of this Journal —my Principal, Dr. S.D.Singh who is also the Chief- editor of our Journal, from my first days in the college supported me and my effort and supported through fund for the continuous publication of the Journal. I get to see and met many of the great economists and personalities in person who time to time blessed me and my effort for the publication of Journal of Economics and Commerce. Many times they released the published issues of the journal. The main personalities I met were, Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, Ex Prime minister and Eminent Economist Dr. Manmohan Singh, Present Prime minister Shri Narendra Modi, Ex Governor of RBI Raghuram Rajan, NITI Ayog Vice Chairman Prof. Rajeev Kumar, Ex Chief Economic Advisor of Government of India Mr K Subramanian, Member of NITI Ayog Prof. Vivek Bebroy, Ex- Planning Commission Vice Chairman Prof. M.S. Ahluwalia, Ex RBI Governor Prof. C. Rangrajan, Eminent Economist and ex advisor of Govt. of India Prof. Sengupta and Panchmukhi, World economists, Prof. Wendy Olsen, Manchester University, UK., Prof Maggie Opondo, University of Nairobi, Prof. Michael Walls, UCL, Prof Flora Kessy, University of Mzumbe, Prof. Per Morten Kind, Durham University, Prof. James Copestake, University of Bath, Prof Robert Hope, Oxford University, Prof. John Kirkland, Association of Commonwealth Universities, Ex - Chairman of UGC Prof. Sukhdev Thorat, Eminent economist and ex -VC of Kolkata University Prof. Sugata Marjit, Union Commerce and Rail Minister Mr. Piyush Goel, Eminent Economist Prof. Amaresh Dubey and Prof. Ravi Srivastava and many more - at conferences and events around the world. Their support, empathy, and unwavering belief that I could and would do great things has been a beacon of hope and a challenge that I constantly strive to meet.

* Associate Professor in Department of Economics, DAV PG College (BHU) and managing Editor of the “ Journal of Economics and Commerce”. Also Associate Editor of “The Indian Economic Journal” and Managing Editor of “Kashi Journal

A decade is a long time. Few things in our lives or in the world last that long—the average tech startup _doesn't quite maketwo years. I'm honoured and humbled that my well wishers stuck with me all that time, and I promise that in the decade ahead, Journal of Economics and Commerce will deliver more and better work in the areas of Economics and Commerce .

Thank you all my well wishers for the ten remarkable years of warmth, cooperation, friendship, and support. I absolutely couldn't have done it without you all, nor can I take the next steps without yours help. I hope you'll keep holding me to high standards, and telling me when I've met your expectations and when I've let you down.

- Dr. Anup Kumar Mishra

Articles Reviewed

DETERMINATION OF AGRICULTURAL DOMESTIC SUPPORT POLICY SPACE IN CHINA BASED ON WTO RULES: A CASE STUDY OF WHEAT

M. P. Singh* Satpal**

ABSTARCT

*This study examines the China's domestic support to agriculture, especially to the wheat producers in the background of some complaints that continue to be made by developed countries. The USA, Australia, European Union, are complaining that China and other developing countries are not following the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) rules properly in providing domestic support to their wheat producers. We have examined China's domestic support to wheat since 1996 to 2016. In addition, we computed policy space for China's government in the context of food security, subject to the condition that Agreement on Agriculture's rules are not violated. The study highlights on the estimation of the China's Current Aggregate Measurements of Support (AMS), and Product-Specific-Support on the basis of data which are submitted by China to the Committee on Agriculture, WTO. We will be using Agreement's Annexure 3, methodology for an estimation of AMS. As per AoA provisions on domestic support, China has 8.5 per cent limit of domestic support [8.5 per cent of Total agriculture production support to agriculture in general **Plus** 8.5 per cent product specific of total production]. The result shows that if China considers the Agreement's Article 18.4 then it has ample policy space for domestic support given to its agricultural producers.*

Key Words : *WTO, Agreement on Agriculture, Domestic Support, Procurement and Wheat*

SECTION : 1

China goes through some fundamental changes in its agricultural policy structure with entering in to 21st Century. Major policy shifts are observed in pricing, marketing, trade, investment and technology . Classical taxing economy is transformed to farmer subsidies . China implemented as a package to reform agricultural policies during 1990-2005 . These reforms are focused on direct payments to farmers, agricultural input subsidies, agricultural tax elimination, minimum market protective support and procurement prices, bring down of barriers to private entry in to agricultural marketing channels, and increased spending on rural infrastructure, research and development. All policy reforms resulted as programmes developed by China for domestic support to its agricultural producers. The basic support programmes in China are as, 'Direct Payment on Grain Production', 'General Subsidy for Agricultural Means of Production', 'Farm Machinery Purchase Subsidies', 'Subsidies to Improved varieties, 'Minimum Purchase Price for Grain', 'Temporary Purchase and Storage', 'Conversion of Cropland to Forest', and 'Conversion of Grazing Land to Grassland' . Many researches show this supporting programme. For example, the Producer Support Estimates (PSE) compiled by OECD and Aggregate Measurements of Support computed by many other researchers i.e., , , , , and .

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The status of China as a member of the WTO is shown in table 1 given below;

Table 1: Basic Information About China as a Member of the WTO	1	WTO Membership	11 December, 2001
	2	Entry Rank	143rd
	3	Country Status	Developing Country
	4	Applicability in Article 6.2	No
	5	Bound Total AMS	<i>De minimis</i>
	6	Current Total AMS 1999-10	<i>ZERO</i>
	7	Current Total AMS to Wheat	<i>Negative or de minimis</i>
	8	Type of AMS Given to Wheat	<i>Market Price Support & Other Support</i>
	9	Art. 6.5 Blue Box Subsidies	Not Used

Source: WTO, Agreement on Agriculture 1995

All domestic Support provisions are primarily associated with the Agreement's Article 1, 6, and 7 along with Annexes 2, 3, and 4. In other words, domestic support is divided into two broad categories: trade distorting support and no or minimal trade distorting support. These two categories are associated with different Domestic Support Boxes like Amber Box, Green Box, Blue Box, Development Box, and *de minimis* level. Except the support under Amber box, all other Boxes supports along with *de minimis* level are considered as no or minimal trade distorting support as per the Agreement Provisions. Green Box Measures are exempted from reduction commitments and can even be increased without any financial limitation as per WTO rules. The Agreement's Annexure 2 provides 12 sub headings to member countries for determination of their policy space under Green Box Support Provisions. Blue Box is associated with direct payments under limiting programmes which are exempted from reduction commitments (Agreement Art. 6.5). The development box, i. e., subsidies under this provision, allows developing countries (except China) to exempt certain measures from their Current Total AMS. Development box includes support through “investment subsidies which are available to agriculture” and support through “agricultural input subsidies generally available to low-income or resource poor producers”. This article also includes those supports which are encouraging diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops (Agreement Art. 6.2). Article 6.4 sets the limit of support to agriculture which falls under the trade-distorting support (AMS). In calculation of the Current Total AMS the inclusion of the supports is not required which is below or equal to 5 per cent of basic agricultural production value and 5 per cent of agriculture production in general for developed countries and this limit is 8.5 per cent for China, in the case of other developing countries the limit is 10 per cent.

Organisation of the paper is as follows: Section 2 is associated with calculation methodology, while Section 3 deals with the Statistical trends of notified domestic support. Section 4 computes product-specific-support as considered in the Agreement's Article 18.4, and finally, Section 5 concludes the main findings and discusses policy suggestions.

SECTION 2: AGGREGATE MEASUREMENT OF SUPPORT (AMS)

The reduction commitments are expressed in terms of a “Total Aggregate Measurement of Support” (Total AMS) which includes all product-specific support and non-product-specific support in one single figure. AMS is the level of support, expressed in monetary terms, provided for an agricultural product in favour of the producers of the basic agricultural product. An AMS has also another side support criteria, AMS means the support provided in favour of agricultural producers in general. The Agreement on Agriculture is often called as product-specific AMS in first case and the non-product-

specific AMS in the latter case. The market price support is an element of product-specific-support and its calculation methodology is given in annex 3 (We have defined in Table 2). One thing which is important here, is market price support calculated for those countries which have an Applied Administered Price (AAP) like, minimum support price (MSP) in case of China. In this situation we compute the gap between the AAP and the Fixed External Reference Price (FERP). After the computation of the gap, it is multiplied by the production (eligible) which has received the Minimum Support Price, fixed by the government.

Article 1(h) provides to compute Current Total AMS for each and every year, current total AMS associated with product specific support and non-product specific support. The upper limit of Current Total AMS was fixed as Bound Total AMS during Uruguay Round (Article 6.3). The present size of a country's Bound Total AMS depends on many factors, including support amounts under various supporting provisions which country provided in the concluding Uruguay Round Negotiations or for the country's later accession to the WTO. The countries without a Bound Total AMS are subject to these limits laid down in Article 7.2(b), under which no single AMS may exceed its *de minimis* level for the given year. As per Article 6.4 provides limit for product specific trade distorting support to 8.5 per cent of total market value of product and 8.5 per cent of total market value of total agriculture production in China.

<i>Table 2: Basic Indicators for Computing AMS</i>			
B_0	=	Base Year	1996-98
W_t	=	<i>Inflation, Consumer Price Index (CPI)</i>	<i>CPI 1996-98=100</i>
<i>ith – Years 1996 – 98, 1999, 00, 01 ... 16.</i>			
A_i	=	<i>Applied Administered Price (AAP)</i>	<i>Market Price</i>
<i>ith – Years 1996 – 98, 1999, 00, 01 ... 16.</i>			
R	=	<i>Fixed External Reference Price (FERP)</i>	<i>C.I.F. Average 1996-98</i>
R_1	=	Inflation Adjusted FERP	$\frac{(R \times W_t)}{100}$
G	=	GAP Using FERP	$(A_i - R)$
G_1	=	GAP Using R_1	$(A_i - R_1)$
P_t	=	Eligible Production	Production Procured by Govt.
<i>ith – Years 1996 – 98, 1999, 00, 01 ... 16.</i>			

3. There is total 32 countries have bound total AMS, 17 developing countries and 15 developed countries.

Table 2a: Product-Specific Market Price Support		
1	Product-Specific AMS: GAP Using FERP	$(G \times P_i)$
2	Product-Specific AMS: GAP Using Inflation Adjusted FERP	$(G_1 \times P_i)$
Table 3b: Current Total AMS is the Sum of Following Components A+B		
Measures		Relevant for China
A. All Product-Specific-AMS Or	Market Price Support	√
	Non-Exempt Direct Payments	×
	Other Non-Exempt Measures	√
All Product-Specific Equivalent Measures Support	Market Price Support	×
	Non-Exempt Direct Payments	×
	Other Non-Exempt Measures	×
B. Non-Product-Specific	Input Subsidies	√

Source: Arranged on the basis of Agreement Annex. 3 & Article 18.4

SECTION 3: STATISTICAL TRENDS OF NOTIFIED DOMESTIC SUPPORT

As per WTO document G/AG/2, 30th June, 1995, all member countries were required to submit their domestic support notifications to the Committee on Agriculture (CoA). These notifications were to be submitted along with the supporting data (Table DS: 1 to 9) and policy framework with respect to domestic support of the concerned country. These notifications were examined by CoA and it identified the level of support of different member countries. CoA was constituted by WTO under Agreement Article 17. All commitments given by member countries at Uruguay Round during implementation review process by the CoA were set under the Article 18.1. The review process of notifications submitted by member countries and such other documentations which were prepared by the WTO Secretariat to facilitate the review process were under Article 18.2. Notifications requirement and formats to be adopted were approved by CoA at its meeting on 8th June, 1995⁴.

Table 3: CHINA (CHN)

(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)	(viii)	(ix)	(x)	(xi)	(xii)	(xiii)	(xiv)
	Unit	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
BTAMS	Yuan	<i>dm</i>	<i>dm</i>	<i>dm</i>	<i>dm</i>	<i>dm</i>	<i>dm</i>	<i>dm</i>	<i>dm</i>	<i>dm</i>	<i>dm</i>	<i>dm</i>	<i>dm</i>
CTAMS	Y	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
GB	YB	184.4	207.9	242.4	252.1	258.0	308.4	309.6	356.5	457.9	593.1	477.5	534.6
BB		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TPSS	100Y	28.5	35.0	17.9	12.7	13.1	42.0	24.5	13.6	114.8	167.6	194.7	253.5
Specific to Wheat	100Y	-167.8	-196.9	-221.5	-159.5	-121.2	2.0	10.5	-106.3	-72.9	-65.2	44.50	57.92
NPSS	100Y	7.0	7.4	7.5	2.3	12.8	19.7	22.0	149.5	307.5	788.6	891.23	976.64

Source: WTO Notifications

Note: BTAMS Final Bound Total Aggregate Measurement of Support

CTAMS Current Total Aggregate Measurement of Support

YB Yuan Billion

GB, BB Green Box, Blue Box


TPSS Total Product-Specific-Support

4. WTO, G/AG/2 30 June, 1995.

NPSS Non-Product-Specific-Support
 (dm) *de minimis* level

Table 3 shows the domestic support to China's agricultural producers. Such data were presented by China from 1999 to 2010 in their domestic support notifications to the Committee on Agriculture. In this Table 3 we have observed two important things; first one indicates zero current total AMS for agriculture sector and second one current total AMS specific to wheat is mostly negative from 1999 to current submissions. However, China's product specific support to wheat was positive for the period of 2004, 05, 09, and 10 but not exceed the *de minimis* level.

Figure 1: China's Domestic Support to Agriculture



Source: Figure Constructed on the bases of Data from Table 3

Table 4 presents China's domestic support to wheat in China. It was submitted by China to CoA through four different notifications since China became the member of WTO. Product specific support to wheat in China was negative during the 1999 to 2007 (Table 4). Although, product specific support to wheat during 2008 to 2010 was positive but it was below the *de minimis* level. Table 4, column 4 presents eligible production referring to the amount purchased by state-owned enterprises from farmers at state procurement price for the food security purpose. China also announced the Protective Price at times it refers to the amount purchased by state-owned enterprise from farmers at protective prices in order to protect former's income. However, Table 5 shows domestic support of China after 2010. It is the shadow calculation for domestic support to China's wheat producers because after 2010 China has not submitted their domestic support notifications to the Committee on Agriculture, WTO. We have computed shadow support assuming that the China's government agencies procured 33 per cent quantity of total wheat production for the food security purposes. This value is just average of notified procured quantity.

Table 5 shows that china crossed the *de minimis* limit (8.5 per cent of total wheat production value) from 2014 onwards. Table 8 formulated on the basis of table 5 indicates State Policy Space concerning to domestic support to the wheat.

Table 4: Domestic Support for Wheat Producers in China

Year	Applied Administered Price	External Reference Price	Eligible Production	Total Market Price Support	Other Product Specific Budgetary Outlays	Total Product Specific Support	Value of Production (VoP)	Share of Market Price in VoP
1	2	3	4	5=2-3*4	6	7=5+6	8	9=7/8*100
CY	Yuan/ton		(000* ton)	Million Yuan				%
1999	1254	1698	37800	-16783	0	-16783	NA	-
2000	1136	1698	35050	-19698	0	-19698	NA	-
2001	1124	1698	38600	22156	0	22156	NA	-
2002	1240	1698	34850	-15961	4	-15957	108280	-15.16
2003	1100	1698	20460	-12235	110	-12125	105600	-11.48
2004	NA	1698	0	0	201	201	141610	0.14
2005	NA	1698	0	0	1058	1058	161860	0.65
2006	1410	1698	40688	-11718	1081	-10637	161360	-6.59
2007	1410	1698	28925	-8330	1101	-7229	182750	-3.96
2008	1490	1698	41740	8682	2159	-6523	199300	-3.27
2009	1700	1698	39855	80	4371	4451	222460	2.00
2010	1760	1698	23113	1433	4359	5792	235330	2.46

Source: China's WTO Notifications on Domestic Support (G/AG/N/CHN/8, 17, 21, 28)

Table 5: Calculated Product Specific Support to Wheat in China

Year	Administered Price	External Reference Price	Eligible Production	Total Production	Product Specific Support (VoP)	Market Support	VoP	Share of Market Price in VoP
Year	Yuan/ton	Yuan/ton	(000* ton)	(000* ton)	Million Yuan	Million Yuan	%	%
1999	1254	1698	37800	37800	0	-16783	0	-
2000	1136	1698	35050	35050	0	-19698	0	-
2001	1124	1698	38600	38600	0	22156	0	-
2002	1240	1698	34850	34850	4	-15957	4	-15.16
2003	1100	1698	20460	20460	110	-12125	110	-11.48
2004	NA	1698	0	0	201	201	201	0.14
2005	NA	1698	0	0	1058	1058	1058	0.65
2006	1410	1698	40688	40688	1081	-10637	1081	-6.59
2007	1410	1698	28925	28925	1101	-7229	1101	-3.96
2008	1490	1698	41740	41740	2159	-6523	2159	-3.27
2009	1700	1698	39855	39855	4371	4451	4371	2.00
2010	1760	1698	23113	23113	4359	5792	4359	2.46

Source: Column 2, CWS's Working Paper by Sachin Kumar WTO and Shrinking Policy Space for Food security: Issues and Challenges for China” extract from <http://wtocentre.iif.ac.in/workingpaper/China%20Food%20Security.pdf> & WTO Notifications <http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=cn&commodity=wheat&graph=production> data extract on 23/08/2017

NOTE: Column 4, shows eligible production, assumed as 33% on an average value of eligible production for 1999 to 2010

Table 6: Determination of Domestic Support Limit for China Assuming Administered Price, Budgetary Support & Production of Wheat for 2016.

Wheat (million yuan)	limit (8.5%) (million yuan)	Support Components	Total Value of Wheat	Eligible Production	in Procurement Quantity
80	5677	Other Budgetary Support ii. Administered Price support	4359 (ii) 27963 Million Yuan 32322 Wheat-Specific AMS is = 10.70% Eligible to given 8.5%	million tone (if budgetary support constant) 38 million tone (if budgetary support zero)	million tone (if budgetary support constant) 4 million tone (if budgetary support zero)

Source: Calculation based on the Data shown in Table 5.

Note: (ii) Administered Price Support in Yuan = [2360-1698*42.24 million ton]

Table 6 presents the determination of domestic support policy space to wheat producers in China. Here, we are assuming that administered price and budgetary support will remain the same at 2010 level. The results show that China can procure up to 25 per cent quantity of total wheat production without cross the *de minimis* limit. China has given two types of product specific support to wheat producer's market price support and budgetary support. If we consider that China procured 33 per cent wheat quantity of total production, then China has crossed the limit as given in AoA of 8.5 per cent of total production. Actually, this policy space for China is like a hypothetical because it is based on assumed procured quantity. It suggests that China may procure 32 million ton of production, or in other words, China procured around 25 per cent of the total wheat production for the period of 2016. These results show that China may face big challenge to increase its market price support to their agricultural producers. However, these results come without consideration of inflation effect on fixed external reference prices. In next section we will examine the policy space for the agricultural domestic support in China with the consideration of inflation effect.

SECTION 4: PRODUCT-SPECIFIC-SUPPORT WITH CONSIDERATION OF AGREEMENT'S ARTICLE 18.4

"In the review process Members shall give due consideration to the influence of excessive rates of inflation on the ability of any Member to abide by its domestic support commitments" (Agreement Article 18.4 page no. 46). proposed three concepts of price gaps which are consistent with Article 18.4 inflation is one among three concepts. 'Inflation Adjusted Fixed External Reference Price' (FERP) gap, adjust the inflation impact on Fixed External Reference Price. The FERP is fixed on a three years average Cost, Insurance and Freight (C.I.F. Price) 1996-98 during China's accession. The China used CIF price because then China was as a net importer of wheat during 1996-98. The ERP was determined on the basis of average price, i.e., CIF prices during the base period (Table 7).


Table 7: Fixed External Reference Price (FERP) Fixed by China during AGST Submission 2001, (CIF Price for Wheat HS-10011000)

Calendar Year	Import Volume (tons)	Import Value (US \$)	CIF Price (US \$/ton)	CIF Price (RMB Yuan/ton)	Official US\$/Yuan Exchange Rate
1996	4512381	1023059000	226.7	1885.0	8.314
1997	1508909	296653000	196.6	1629.6	8.289
1998	1275384	243373000	190.8	1579.8	8.279
Average of 1996-98			204.7	1698.1	8.294

Source: WTO Notification, 2001 (China's Accession Document) WT/ACC/CHN/38/Rev.3

Even after two decades accession to WTO, inflation was not considered to determine the ERP for wheat. So, the real picture of supporting amount to wheat producers was not visualised. China can argue for full inflation allowance to be given while calculating support to wheat as provision made by the Agreement's Article 18.4. In this section we compute Inflation Adjusted FERP Gap, and calculated again Market Price Support for China's Wheat producers for the period of 1999 to 2016. I made the study on the base year 1996-1998 equal to 100. This is used in table-8.

Figure 2: Inflation, Consumer Price Index (CPI), Based on 1996-98=100




Source: Data are extracted from World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund <<http://www.econstats.com/weo/V016.htm>> on 28.08.2017

This figure 2, presents the CPI based on estimated price level 1996-98=100. It is an average consumer price index including all commodities.

SECTION 5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS

This section brings out the results of computation of product specific support to wheat with adjustment of inflation effect on fixed external reference prices. Without consideration of inflation impact we have shown wheat AMS policy space in Table 6.

Figure 3: Comparison among Three Different Prices



Source: WTO Notifications and GAIN Report No. CH17017

Note: IAFERP Inflation Adjusted Fixed External Reference Price, AAP- Applied Administrative Price, FERP- Fixed External Reference Price

Table 8: Market Price Support with *Adjustment of Inflation effect on FERP*

Year	AAP	Inflation Adjusted FERP	Gap Using Inflation Adjusted FERP	Eligible Production	Wheat Specific Market Price Support	% Support of Total Wheat Production Value
	Yuan/Ton			Million Ton	Yuan Million	%
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1999	1254	1680.579	-426.579	37.80	-16124.70	-
2000	1136	1687.312	-551.312	35.05	-19323.50	-
2001	1124	1699.599	-575.599	38.60	-22218.10	-
2002	1240	1686.554	-446.554	34.85	-15562.40	-14.37
2003	1100	1706.248	-606.248	20.46	-12403.80	-11.74
2004	NA	1772.734	NA	0	NA	NA
2005	NA	1804.967	NA	0	NA	NA
2006	1410	1831.477	-421.477	40.69	-17149.00	-10.62
2007	1410	1918.750	-508.750	28.92	-14715.60	-8.05
2008	1490	2031.944	-541.944	41.74	-22620.80	-11.35
2009	1700	2018.058	-318.058	39.85	-12676.20	-5.69
2010	1760	2085.133	-325.133	23.11	-7514.80	-3.19
2011	1930	2198.075	-268.075	38.74	-10385.20	-4.58
2012	2040	2270.957	-230.957	39.94	-9224.43	-3.73
2013	2240	2339.968	-99.968	40.24	-4022.71	-1.47
2014	2360	2410.157	-50.157	41.65	-2089.03	-0.70
2015	2360	2482.450	-122.450	42.96	-5260.44	-1.71
2016	2360	2556.931	-196.931	42.24	-8318.36	-2.75

Source: Source: China's WTO Notifications on Domestic Support (G/AG/N/CHN/8, 17, 21, 28).

Column 2, CWS's Working Paper by Sachin Kumar WTO and Shrinking Policy Space for Food security: Issues and Challenges for China" extract from <http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/workingpaper/China%20Food%20Security.pdf> & WTO Notifications <http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=cn&commodity=wheat&graph=production> data extract on 23/08/2017

Data excess from World Economic Outlook International Monetary Fund <<http://www.econstats.com/weo/V016.htm>> on 28.08.2017.

After considering the impact of inflation in to computation of product specific AMS China's market price support to wheat is negative. Without adjusted inflation effect FERP for 2016 was Yuan 1680/Ton, while after adjustment of inflation, it has increased to Yuan 876/Ton, FERP has increased around 52 per cent Yuan/Ton from initial period of notified support that was 1999. However, China's support price for 1999 was 1254 and it has increased to 88 per cent becoming Yuan 2360/Ton in 2016. China procured wheat production on an average around 33 per cent during 1999 to 2010. Table-8, column 4 shows Gap using Inflation Adjusted FERP. In other words, we can say that it is Wheat Support per Yuan/Ton, in China was still negative during 1999 to 2016.

Table 9 computed policy space for domestic support to the China's wheat producers with inflation impact. The calculation is based on following assumptions:

- Assumption No. 1 : Other Budgetary Outlays are fixed as 5841 which shows 34 % increments of 4359 Yuan amount,¹ notified, in last submission - 2010.
 Assumption No. 2 : Total Production is Fixed as 128 Million Ton (2016)
 Assumption No. 3 : Procurement Quantity is Fixed as 42 Million Ton (2016)
 Assumption No. 4 : At 50 & 100 per cent Increments in AAP, Column 8 is fixed as zero

Table 9: Policy Space with Consideration of Inflation Impact (2016)

Policy MSP Increase/Decrease / Constant	Total Production (Million Ton)	Eligible Production (Million Ton)	Subsidies Yuan Per Ton (GAP= AAP- Inflation Adjusted ERP)	AAP/Ton	VOP (Million Yuan)	Total Market Price Support (Yuan Million)	Other Product Specific Budgetary Outlays (Million Yuan)	Total Product Support as % Of Total VOP	WTO Limit As 8.5% of Total VoP	Total Support to Wheat	Subsidies Amount May Be Increased (Yuan Million)	Procurement Quantity [as maximum Limit] (Million Ton)	% of Total Production
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Base MSP	128	42	-196.93	2360	302080	-8232	5841	-0.79	8.5	-2391	25676	-	-
Increase 10 %	128	42	39.07	2596	332288	1641	5841	2.25	8.5	7482	28244	TP	100
Increase 20 %	128	42	275.07	2832	362496	11552	5841	4.79	8.5	17393	30812	90	71
Increase 30 %	128	42	511.07	3068	392704	21465	5841	6.95	8.5	27305	33380	54	42
Increase 40 %	128	42	747.07	3304	422912	31376	5841	8.80	8.5	37218	35947	40	31
Increase 50 %	128	42	983.07	3540	453120	41288	0	9.11	8.5	41288	38515	39	30
Increase 100 %	128	23	2163.07	4720	604160	13770	0	8.23	8.5	49750	51353	23	18

Source: Calculation is based on Table 5 and 8.

<http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=cn&commodity=wheat&graph=production> data extracted on 23/08/2017. Data are extracted from World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund <<http://www.econstats.com/weo/V016.htm>> on 28.08.2017. GAIN Report No. CH17017.

Table 9 presents the result after consideration of inflation impact along with increased Minimum Support Price for Wheat producers on the basis of year 2016's production and procurement. Procurement quantity is assumed the same as considered in Table 5 (33 %), it is the average volume of government's purchasing quantity since 1999-10. Table 9's column 1 shows alternative increments in MSP on the basis of year 2016. Initially, China's government had announced MSP Yuan 2360/Ton for the period of 2016. However, at this level China's domestic support to wheat was negative. But, Other Budgetary Outlays was positive, resulting in to 1.85 per cent of total value of wheat production. This Table presents some important observations: China may be able to procure whole quantity of wheat production without break, the allowable limit and without reduction in Other Budgetary Outlays support. Second observation, if China Government wants to increase MSP by 10 per cent on 2016 base MSP along with fixed Other Budgetary Outlays support, China's total domestic support to wheat will be 2.25 per cent. However, it can be increased upto 8.5 per cent of total wheat production. Third observation shows, if amount of MSP increased to 40 per cent from the base MSP price/Ton (2016). At 40 per cent increments China can procure 30 per cent of total wheat production along with Yuan 5841,

5. The Rationality behind 34 per cent is China's latest notification had submitted for the calendar year 2010. AAP Increase around 34 per cent from 2010 to 2016. But Other Budgetary Outlays Support not has given so we assume its increments 34 per cent from 2010 as notified by China.

Other Budgetary Outlays support. If government wants to increase base MSP by 100 per cent, then governments per ton amount will be Yuan 2163.07/Ton, at this support level government can procure only 23 million ton wheat production without breaching *de minimis* limit, although, in this case we assume that Other Budgetary Outlays support is zero. In other words, government gives subsidies only one form that is market price support to the wheat producers. In case of 100 per cent increment China can procure only 18 per cent volume of total wheat production at the MSP increment of 10 to 30 per cent China's product specific support to wheat is well below to the *de minimis* limit. With the increment of 10 per cent China can procure whole quantity of wheat production subject to production fixed as 128 million ton as mentioned in above assumptions.

CONCLUSIONS

Most of the developing countries like China are facing same subsidy reduction pressures from the advanced countries. Here, one question arises why advanced countries pressurise developing countries to reduce their subsidies to agriculture sector. The most important thing is the pattern of subsidies between developed and developing countries which are provided by AoA. According to Agreement on Agriculture domestic supports to agriculture are categorised in to two broad headings: subsidies under exempt category to reduction commitment and subsidies under non-exempt category. Advanced countries give huge subsidies to their agricultural producers under exempt category which is not required to reduction commitment like Green Box subsidies. However, developing countries have also provision to give green box subsidies but their economic structures do not give permission to huge support to agriculture under this category. Second important observation is that developing countries give support to agriculture producers through market price support. The reason behind it is that food security concern and price stability concern. But, both concerns are against the advanced countries interest. Because developed countries like USA are largest exporters of agricultural products. They want to disturb self-sufficiency of developing countries in their food grains, so developing countries are alleged regarding agricultural subsidies. However, various proposals on food security regarding developing countries are discussed during Doha Round negotiations which endeavour to give relaxation to the developing countries to implement the food security policy without breaking the provisions of Agreement on Agriculture. Same issues are raised by G33 and group of other developing countries during 10th Ministerial Conference held at Nairobi on 15-18 December, 2015.

This study clearly brings out the hollowness of objections to China's agricultural subsidies, if it is calculated under consideration of Article 18.4 of AoA. China has ample policy space to give domestic support to its agricultural producers. If China uses inflation allowance or AMS computation under Article 18.4, it may increase minimum purchase price up to 30 per cent along with increment in other budgetary outlays by 34 per cent on base year 2016 and 2010, respectively.

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INFLUENCE OF PER CAPITA INCOME ON GENDER EQUITY IN UTTAR PRADESH: A DISTRICT WISE ANALYSIS

Dr. Kaushlendra Vikram Mishra *

ABSTRACT

Statistics reveal that in India, males significantly outnumber females and this imbalance has increased over time. According to 2011 census, report the sex ratio stands at 940 per 1000 males. Women face discrimination right from the childhood. In childhood and adulthood, males are fed first and better. The tradition also requires that women eat last and least throughout their lives even when pregnant and lactating. Malnourished women give birth to malnourished children. Women receive less healthcare facilities than men. Many women in rural areas die in childbirth due to easily preventable complications.

According to census 2011, Uttar Pradesh has huge population (199581477 persons) and continues to be the most populous state in the country. Here in Uttar Pradesh the birth of the male is celebrated, whereas the birth of a female filled with pain. Sons are showered with love, respect, better food and proper health care. Males are promoted to be tough and outgoing while females are encouraged to be homely and shy. All these differences are gender differences and they are created by our society.

In the present study, an attempt has been made to examine the Influence of Per Capita Income on Gender Equity in Uttar Pradesh.

Key Words: Gender Equity, Per Capita Income, Mortality Rate, Literacy Rate, Work Participation Rate, Sex Ratio etc.

1. INTRODUCTION

According to census 2011, Uttar Pradesh has huge population (199581477 persons) and continues to be the most populous state in the country. Here in Uttar Pradesh the birth of the male is celebrated, whereas the birth of a female filled with pain. Sons are showered with love, respect, better food and proper health care. Males are promoted to be tough and outgoing while females are encouraged to be homely and shy. All these differences are gender differences and they are created by our society.

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Bils and Klenow (1998)² assert that it is not education that leads to growth, but growth that leads to education. As has been shown in past studies, returns to education increase substantially as an economy becomes more developed.

Barro, Robert and Jong-wha Lee (1994)³ use a panel data set of 138 countries to examine the

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2. Bils, Mark and Peter J. Klenow (1998), "Does Schooling Cause Growth or the Other Way Around?" *NBER Working Paper* 6393, 1998.

3. Barro, Robert and Jong-wha Lee (1994) "International Comparisons of Educational Attainment." *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 1993, 32 (3), pp. 363-394.

empirical determinants of growth, including measures for both male and female schooling. In what they see as a “puzzling finding”, female education is negatively correlated with growth. Barro and Lee attribute this to a sign of “backwardness” in the society, where gender differences are picking up on aspects of undeveloped countries that may not have been captured with an initial GDP variable. Therefore, such less developed countries may experience higher growth rates due to a convergence mechanism.

Psacharopoulos (1994)⁴ finds that returns to female education are positive and higher than, their male counterparts. This micro literature also points to indirect benefits from gender equality.

Quibria M.G. (1995)⁵ “Gender and Poverty: Issues and Policies with Special Reference to Asian Developing Countries.” has studied and found that across the globe, women are less educated and receive worse healthcare than their male counterparts receive.

Behrman, Jere, Andrew D. Foster, Mark R Rosenzweig, and Prem Vashishtha(1999)⁶ find that children of more literate mothers in India study nearly two more hours a night. In addition, gender inequality has been shown to influence a number of development related goals, such as lower fertility rates, higher education rates, and better child health.

Seguino, Stephanie (2000a; 2000b)⁷ has studied and found that in a sample of export-oriented Asian nations, higher rates of growth are actually correlated with higher rates of gender inequality. She attributes this to the ability of firms to pay female labor less than males without fear of backlash or revolution, thus spurring investment.

Sen Amartya (2001)⁸, in his essay “Many Faces of Gender Inequality”, opined that there is need to take a plural view of gender inequality, which can have many different faces. The prominent faces of gender injustice can vary from one region to another, and also from one period to the next. He further described that the Gender inequality hurts the interests not only of girls and grown-up women, but also of boys and men, through biological connections (such as childhood undernourishment and cardiovascular diseases at later ages) and also through societal connections (including in politics and in economic and social life).

Esteve-Volart, Berta (2004)⁹ finds that when studying different states in India, those with higher rates of gender discrimination exhibit lower growth rates compared to others. However, do these concerns impact the growth of the country.

Awoyemi, Taiwo and Adetola I. Adeoti (2006)¹⁰ have examined the effect that gender inequality in employment has in rural cassava farm holdings in southwest Nigeria, and found that increased gender inequality decreases productive efficiency.

Quentin Brummet (2008)¹¹, “The Effect of Gender Inequality on Growth: A Cross-Country

4. Psacharopoulos, George. (1994) “Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update.” *World Development*, 1994, 22 (9), pp. 1325-1343.

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Empirical Study” has studied and found that an underinvestment in women's education has a negative effect on growth.

3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

Following are the main objectives of the study-

1. Highlight the gender equity among districts of Uttar Pradesh,
2. To illustrate the status of per capita income among districts of Uttar Pradesh,
3. To focus on effects of per capita income on gender equity.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study is based on secondary data source. The data are collected from Census of India and Department of Statistics. The time series and cross sectional data are collected for 71 districts of Uttar Pradesh. We have selected seven indicators; six of gender equality and one of per capita income. The indicators are discussed below-

- **Indicators of Gender Equality:**

1. Gaps between Male & Female Mortality Rate (U5 MR) (R1):

Less Gaps between Female & Male Mortality Rate (under 5 years) means more gender equality.

2. Sex Ratio at Birth (R2):

More Sex Ratio at Birth means more gender equality.

3. Sex Ratio at All Age Group (R3):

More Sex Ratio at all age group means more gender equality.

4. Gaps between Male & Female Literacy Rate (R4):

Less Gaps between Literacy Rate of Male & Female means more gender equality.

5. Gaps between Male & Female Work Participation Rate (R5):

Less Gaps between Male & Female work participation rate means more gender equality.

6. Child Sex Ratio 0-6 Year (R6):

More Child Sex Ratio means more gender equality.

- **Indicator of Income:**

We have taken PCI as indicator for Income.

1. **Per Capita Income :**

More per capita income means more economically sound district.

- Limitations of the Study:

Doing research on gender equity is very complicated in nature because society has traditional as well as modern characteristics simultaneously. Moreover, the secondary data source has its own limitations. In spite of the above difficulties, an attempt is made here to bring out information and analyze it with all care.

5. DISCUSSION

- **Meaning of Gender Discrimination:**

According to Kofi Annan “Gender equality is more than a goal in itself. It is a precondition for meeting the challenges of reducing poverty, promoting sustainable development, and building good governance.” Gender inequality has adverse impact on development goals as reduces economic

11. Quentin Brummet(2008), “The Effect of Gender Inequality on Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study”. The Park Place Economist, Volume 22 olume XVI,pp.20-21.

growth. It hampers the overall well being because blocking women from participation in social, political and economic activities can adversely affect the whole society. Many developing countries including India have displayed gender inequality in education, employment and health. It is common to find girls and women suffering from high mortality rates. There are vast differences in education level of two sexes.

Statistics reveal that in India, males significantly outnumber females and this imbalance has increased over time. According to 2011 census, report the sex ratio stands at 940 per 1000 males. Out of the total population, 180 million are women who live in abject poverty. The maternal mortality rate in rural areas is among the world's highest. The deaths of young girls in India exceed those of young boys by over 300,000 each year and every 6th infant death is specifically due to gender discrimination.

The tradition also requires that women eat last and least throughout their lives even when pregnant and lactating. Malnourished women give birth to malnourished children, perpetuating the cycle. Women receive less healthcare facilities than men. A primary way that parents discriminate against their girl children is through neglect during illness. As an adult they tend to be less likely to admit that they are sick and may wait until their sickness has progressed far before they seek help or help is sought for them. Many women in rural areas die in childbirth due to easily preventable complications. Women's social training to tolerate suffering and their reluctance to be examined by male personnel are additional constraints in their getting adequate health care.

- **Sex Ratio and Gender Inequality:**

Sex ratio is the simple way to understand gender inequality. Generally, if the sex ratio of any society is high it means gender equality otherwise, it seems gender inequality.

- **Discrimination of Sex Ratio - Top five and Bottom five States in India:**

As per Census 2011, top five states/Union territories, which have the highest sex ratio, are Kerala (1,084) followed by Puducherry (1,038), Tamil Nadu (995), Andhra Pradesh (992) and Chhattisgarh (991). Five states/Union territories, which have the lowest sex ratio, are Daman & Diu (618), Dadra & Nagar Haveli (775), Chandigarh (818), NCT of Delhi (866) and Andaman & Nicobar Islands (878).

- **District wise Sex Ratio in Uttar Pradesh:**

It is interesting to analyze sex ratio in different districts of Uttar Pradesh and compare it with not only each other but national average as well. Among the 71 district of the state, we arranged in three groups as high sex ratio, medium sex ratio and low sex ratio groups. From the table no.1 it can be seen that sex ratio of 17 districts are higher than national average (936/1000male). Moreover, the contribution of these districts in population of Uttar Pradesh is 26.15 percent (5.21 carors).

Likewise, top five district of Uttar Pradesh, which have the highest sex ratio, are Jaunpur(1018), Azamgarh(1017), Deoria(1013), Pratapgarh (994)and Sultanpur(978). However, five districts that have the lowest sex ratio are Gautam Buddh Nagar (852), Kanpur Nagar (852), Hardoi (856), Mathura (858), and Bagpat (858).

Table No.1 : District wise Sex Ratio in U.P. - 2011

DISTRICT WISE SEX-RATIO IN UTTAR PRADESH - 2011 (High, Medium, and Low) (In 2011 U.P's Average Sex-Ratio : 908) (In 2011 India's Average Sex-Ratio : 936)					
High Sex Ratio (24District) (909-1018)		Medium Sex Ratio (24District) (879-908)		Low Sex Ratio (23District) (852-879)	
Jaunpur	1018	Barabanki	908	KashiramNagar	879
Azamgarh	1017	JyotibaPhuleNagar	907	Ghaziabad	878
Deoria	1013	Lucknow	906	Aligarh	876
Pratapgarh	994	Kaushambi	905	Mainpuri	876
Sultanpur	978	Lalitpur	905	Shrawasti	875
Mau	978	Rampur	905	Farrukhabad	874
Ambedkar Nagar	976	Moradabad	903	MahamayaNagar	870
Siddharth Nagar	970	Allahabad	902	Firozabad	867
Sant Kabir Nagar	969	Unnao	901	Etawah	867
Faizabad	961	Mirzapur	900	Jalaun	865
Basti	959	Fatehpur	900	Shahjhapur	865
Kushi Nagar	955	Bulandshahar	892	Auraiya	864
Ghazipur	951	Bahraich	891	Etah	863
Sant Ravidas Nagar	950	Pilibhit	889	Banda	863
Gorakhpur	944	Kheri	887	KanpurDehat	862
Rae Bareli	941	Sharanpur	887	Hamirpur	860
Mahrajgang	938	Muzaffar Nagar	886	Agra	859
Ballia	933	Jhansi	885	Budaun	859
Balrampur	922	Meerut	885	Bagpat	858
Gonda	922	Bareilly	883	Mathura	858
Sonbhadra	913	Mahoba	880	Hardoi	856
Chandauli	913	Sitapur	879	Kanpur Nagar	852
Bijnor	913	Chitrakoot	879	Gautam Buddh Nagar	852
Varanasi	909	Kaunnauj	879		

• **Sex Ratio of India in Comparison to Neighboring Countries:**

It would be quite useful when we compare sex ratio of Uttar Pradesh with neighboring countries. From the table no. 2 it can be revealed that India and Uttar Pradesh are far behind their neighboring countries. India placed before only Bhutan (897) and Afghanistan (931) and remaining all neighboring countries- Myanmar (1,048), Sri Lanka (1,032), Nepal (1,014), and Bangladesh (978) are better positioned as far as sex ratio is concerned. Besides, India and Uttar Pradesh are placed rear as compared to world average (984). From the above explanation, it can be concluded that condition of sex ratio in Uttar Pradesh is unjust.

Table No.2 : Sex Ratio of India in Comparison to Neighboring Countries

Sex Ratio of India in Comparison to Neighboring Countries# (In 2010 World Average: 984) (In 2011 U.P's Average Sex-Ratio : 908) (In 2011 India's Average Sex-Ratio : 936)		
Sl.No.	Country	Sex Ratio
1	Myanmar	1,048
2	Sri Lanka	1,032
3	Nepal	1,014
4	Bangladesh	978
5	Pakistan	942
6	Afghanistan	931
7	Bhutan	897

District wise Per Capita Income on Current Price (11-12):

It is useful to analyze Per Capita Income in different districts of Uttar Pradesh and compare it with each other. Among the 71 district of the state, we arranged in three groups as high Per Capita Income, medium Per Capita Income and low Per Capita Income groups. From the table no.3 it can be seen that Per Capita Income of only one district Gautam Budha Nagar (Rs.123283) is higher than national average (Rs.61560). It is also evident that Per Capita Income of Uttar Pradesh (Rs. 30051) is just half of the national average (Rs.61560), showing poor condition of state's economy.

From the table no.3 it can also be evident that Per Capita Income of 32 districts is higher than state average (Rs. 30051) and rest 39 district's Per Capita Income is lower.

Table No.3 : District wise Per Capita Income on Current Price (11-12)

District Wise Gender Equity Index:

5-11-12-13 t s'n/ A-11-12-13 s / j 'n's-n' s (11-12) (High, Medium, and Low) (In 2011-12 U.P's Per Capita Income on Current Price Rs. 30051) (In 2011-12, India's Per Capita Income on Current Price Rs.61560)					
I Per Capita Income		a s'f Per Capita Income		I Per Capita Income	
5-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	5-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	5-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
D-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	I-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	D-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
W-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	9-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	W-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
. A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	a-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	. A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
[j-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	. j-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	[j-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
a s's-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	Y-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	a s's-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
. j-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	Y-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	. j-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
D-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	{ A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	D-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
a A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	. A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	a A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
Y-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	. A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	Y-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
W-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	9-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	W-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
a A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	! A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	a A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
a A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	a A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	a A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
/ A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	w-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	/ A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
a j-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	Ü-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	a j-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
{ A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	C-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	{ A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
. A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	C-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	. A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
! A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	Y-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	! A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
Y-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	é A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	Y-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
! A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	Y-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	! A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
. A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	C-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	. A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
t A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	C-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	t A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
! j-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	{ A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	! j-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
{ A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	{ A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	{ A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)
W-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	/ A-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)	W-11-12-13	t / I(Rs.)

Table No.4 : District Wise Gender Equity Index

District Wise Gender Equity Index					
District of High Gender Equity	Gender Equity Index	District of Medium Gender Equity	Gender Equity Index	District of Low Gender Equity	Gender Equity Index
Mau	94	RaeBareli	191	Varanasi	235
Ambedkar Nagar	101	Pilibhit	191	Etawah	236
Pratapgarh	118	Gonda	192	Aligarh	238
Deoria	126	Saharanpur	200	KanpurNager	239
Ghazipur	129	Unnao	203	Chitrakoot	239
SantKabirNagar	133	Mirzapur	204	Farrukhabad	241
Basti	134	Bahraich	205	Bijnor	242
Barabanki	137	Sitapur	206	Hamirpur	243
Kushinagar	138	Allahabad	211	Mahoba	248
Azamgarh	140	Moradabad	211	Ghaziabad	252
Chandauli	152	Kannauj	213	Hardoi	253
Lucknow	153	Fatehpur	214	Meerut	254
Maharajganj	162	SantRavidasNagar	216	Shrawasti	279
Balrampur	169	Jalaun	219	Gautam Buddha Nagar	280
Gorakhpur	170	Rampur	221	Shahjahanpur	282
Sultanpur	171	Kheri	222	Muzaffarnagar	282
Faizabad	171	Baghpat	225	Etah	284
Jaunpur	176	KanpurDehat	226	Firozabad	301
Siddharthnagar	178	Bareilly	228	Banda	310
Sonbhadra	179	Bulandshahar	230	Agra	312
Lalitpur	184	Jyotiba Phule Naga	230	Hathras	328
Ballia	188	Auraiya	231	Budaun	341
Mainpuri	189	Kaushambi	233	Mathura	344

For the study of Gender Equity, we made a composite Index which comprising six of gender equalities. The indicators are- R1: Gaps between Male & Female Mortality Rate (U5 MR), R2: Sex Ratio at Birth, R3: Sex Ratio at All Age Group, R4: Gaps between Male & Female Literacy Rate, R5: Gaps between Male & Female Work Participation Rate, R6: Child Sex Ratio 0-6 Year.

After that we have added all the ranks of R1, R2, R3, R4, R5 and R6 of each district and made a composite index called Gender Equity Index. Less the Gender Equity Index shows high the gender equity and more the Gender Equity Index means low the gender equity.

It is interesting to analyze **Gender Equity Index** in different districts of Uttar Pradesh and compare it with each other. Among the 71 district of the state, we arranged in three groups as high Gender Equity Index, medium Gender Equity Index and low Gender Equity Index groups.

From the table no.5 it can be seen that having least Gender Equity composite index Mau (94) is the topper of all 71 districts followed by Ambedkar Nagar (101) Pratapgarh (118) Deoria (126) Ghazipur (129) SantKabirNagar (133) Basti (134) Barabanki (137) Kushinagar (138) and Azamgarh (140). From the above table it can be seen that these top 10 districts are having good gender equity in U.P. Similarly, having most composite index Mathura (344) is the lowest gender equity among all districts followed by Budaun (341), Hathras (328), Agra (312), Banda (310) Firozabad (301), Etah (284), Muzaffarnagar (282), Shahjahanpur (282) and Gautam Buddha Nagar (280). From the above table it can be observed that these lowest 10 districts are having worst gender equity in U.P.

• **District wise Gender Equity Index and Per Capita Income:**

In this research, we are trying to analysis the impact of Per Capita Income (economic prosperity) on gender equity. For this purpose we have two-way- data classification, we have arranged high, medium and low of gender equity on the top of the table, while high, medium and low of Per Capita Income on the left side of the table.

Table No.5 : District wise Gender Equity Index and Per Capita Income

	High (GEI: 94 to 189)	Medium (GEI: 191 to 233)	Low (GEI: 235 to 344)
High (Rs.33085 to 123283)	(HH) Lucknow, Sonbhadra	(HM) Pilibhit, Saharanpur, Baghpat, Bareilly, Bulandshahar, Jyotiba Phule Naga, Auraiya, Jhansi, Jalaun	(HL) Aligarh, KanpurNager, Chitrakoot, Bijnor, Mahoba, Ghaziabad, Meerut, Gautam Buddha Nagar, Muzaffarnagar, Agra, Hathras, Mathura
Medium (Rs.24315 to 31497)	(MH) Chandauli, Faizabad, Lalitpur, Mainpuri	(MM) Unnao, Sitapur, Allahabad, Moradabad, Kannauj, Fatehpur, Sant Ravidas Nagar, Rampur, Kheri, Kanpur Dehat, Kaushambi	(ML) Varanasi, Etawah, Farrukhabad, Hamirpur, Shahjahanpur, Etah, Firozabad, Banda, Budaun
Low (Rs.14600 to 23858)	(LH) Mau, Ambedkar Nagar, Pratapgarh, Deoria, Ghazipur, Sant Kabir Nagar, Basti, Barabanki, Kushinagar, Azamgarh, Maharajganj, Balrampur, Gorakhpur, Sultanpur, Jaunpur, Siddharthnagar, Ballia	(LM) Rae Bareli, Gonda, Mirzapur, Bahraich	(LL) Hardoi, Shrawasti

It can be clearly seen by the table no.5 that Lucknow(HH) and Sonbhadra(HH) district are good at both-gender equity as well as per capita income. Similarly, two district Hardoi(LL) and Shrawasti(LL) are worst in both characterstics. Moreover, 10 districts Unnao, Sitapur, Allahabad, Moradabad, Kannauj, Fatehpur, Sant Ravidas Nagar, Rampur, Kheri, Kanpur Dehat and Kaushambi are (MM) moderate at both the conditions- per capita income and gender equity.

The districts Mau, Ambedkar Nagar, Pratapgarh, Deoria, Ghazipur, Sant Kabir Nagar, Basti, Barabanki, Kushinagar, Azamgarh, Maharajganj, Balrampur, Gorakhpur, Sultanpur, Jaunpur, Siddharthnagar and Ballia are (LH) low at per capita income but high at gender equity. Similarly, the districts Aligarh, Kanpur Nager, Chitrakoot, Bijnor, Mahoba, Ghaziabad, Meerut, Gautam Buddha Nagar, Muzaffarnagar, Agra, Hathras and Mathura are (HL) high at per capita income whereas low at gender equity. It can also be seen that out of 71 district 26 district are having inverse characteristics, either (LH) or (HL).

We also applied Karl Pearson's coefficient of correlation (r) between per capita income (PCI) and gender equity index (GEI) and found r value -0.62. This negative r value has also confirmed the inverse impact of Per Capita Income on Gender Equity.

Hence, It can be concluded that the impact of Per Capita Income on Gender Equity is showing

negative.

6. CONCLUSION

From the above discussion it can be concluded that-

Per Capita Income: Per Capita Income of only one district **Gautam Budha Nagar** (Rs.123283) is higher than national average (Rs.61560). It is also evident that Per Capita Income of Uttar Pradesh (**Rs. 30051**) is just half of the national average (Rs.61560), showing poor condition of state's economy.

Gender Equity: it can be seen that having least **Gender Equity** composite index Mau (94) is the topper of all 71 districts. Similarly, having most composite index Mathura (344) is the lowest gender equity among all districts.

Impact of PCI on Gender Equity: It can be clearly seen that Lucknow(HH) and Sonbhadra(HH) district are good at both-gender equity as well as per capita income. Similarly, two district Hardoi(LL) and Shrawasti(LL) are worst in both characteristics. The districts Mau, Ambedkar Nagar, Pratapgarh, Deoria, Ghazipur, Sant Kabir Nagar, Basti, Barabanki, Kushinagar, Azamgarh, Maharajganj, Balrampur, Gorakhpur, Sultanpur, Jaunpur, Siddharthnagar and Ballia are (LH) low at per capita income but high at gender equity. Similarly, the districts Aligarh, Kanpur Nager, Chitrakoot, Bijnor, Mahoba, Ghaziabad, Meerut, Gautam Buddha Nagar, Muzaffarnagar, Agra, Hathras and Mathura are (HL) high at per capita income whereas low at gender equity. It can also be seen that out of 71 district 26 district are having inverse characteristics, either (LH) or (HL).

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SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA: AN EMERGING BREED OF ENTREPRENEURS FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH

Saurabh Kumar Srivastava*

ABSTARCT

To fulfill these needs, sustainable solution is required to improve their life with development objectives and this vision and task is usually faced by social enterprises are that may be understood as hallmark of social entrepreneurs. It is heartening to discover these attributes in the social entrepreneurs of the organisations selected for the current research study. Even though social Entrepreneurship is in its infancy in the India, in this scenario, this study has found ample evidence for the potential of social entrepreneurship for problem solving among the marginalized population in the needy areas, which has been covered by this study. In comparing with the economy and social entrepreneurs we found that, the Indian economy advanced 5 percent year-on-year in the second quarter of 2019, slowing from a 5.8 percent expansion in the prior period and missing market consensus of 5.7 percent. It was the weakest growth rate since the first quarter of 2013, amid a slowdown in manufacturing and construction sectors. In order to sustain their growth, SEs need to access mainstream capital. Investor interest is gradually increasing as early investors are starting to see returns, and high growth is seen across sectors. SEs that are successful both from profitability and impact points of view now exist across key sectors.

In any circumstances, serving the people at the bottom of the pyramid or at grass root level is most important. To fulfill these needs, sustainable solution is required to improve their life with development objectives and this vision and task is usually faced by social enterprises are that may be understood as hallmark of social entrepreneurs. It is heartening to discover these attributes in the social entrepreneurs of the organisations selected for the current research study. Even though social Entrepreneurship is in its infancy in the India, in this scenario, this study has found ample evidence for the potential of social entrepreneurship for problem solving among the marginalized population in the needy areas, which has been covered by this study.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY AND IMPROVEMENT NEEDED

Government has its responsibility to create opportunity for Personal Welfare and Social Transformation which ultimately mean to welfare of the people. This is enough to understand the basic ideology of social transformation that this need of welfare is only for marginalized community of the society, doesn't matter rural or urban. In the fields of opportunity for personal welfare and education, job creation, employability building, income generation, and over-all transformation of society and its constituents, Social Entrepreneurship brings benefits that are amenable to measurements in quantitative terms and qualitative terms as well. The social transformation that is brought about is always for the benefit of the sections of society which are disadvantaged and

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marginalized, be it physically, mentally, or socially.

This integration of the marginalized groups into the mainstream of society, through education, income generation and better living facilities, certainly enhances the welfare of society in which they live. The exclusion of the disadvantaged groups by the elitist mindsets diminishes as they acquire a new standard of life and become aware of greater personal dignity due to the intervention of the social entrepreneur and his/her initiatives.

CURRENT ECONOMIC SCENARIO

The Indian economy advanced 5 percent year-on-year in the second quarter of 2019, slowing from a 5.8 percent expansion in the prior period and missing market consensus of 5.7 percent. It was the weakest growth rate since the first quarter of 2013, amid a slowdown in manufacturing and construction sectors.

Gross Value Added, that is, GDP excluding taxes grew 4.9 percent in the three months to June, easing from a 5.7 percent expansion in the previous quarter. Output growth slowed in manufacturing (0.6 percent from 3.1 percent in Q1); construction (5.7 percent from 7.1 percent); mining (2.7 percent from 4.2 percent); public administration and defense (8.5 percent from 10.7 percent); and financial, real estate and professional services (5.9 percent from 9.5 percent). On the other hand, agriculture, forestry and fishing activities rose 2 percent, rebounding from a 0.1 percent contraction in the previous quarter and trade, hotel, transport, communication and services related to broadcasting went up 7.1 percent, faster than a 6 percent in Q1.

On the expenditure side, household spending accounted for 55.1 percent of the GDP (56.8 percent in Q1); gross fixed capital formation for 32.5 percent (30.7 percent in Q1); public expenditure for 11.8 percent (9.9 percent in Q1); and changes in stocks for 1.1 percent, the same as in the first quarter of 2019. Exports accounted for 20.6 percent (20 percent in Q1) while imports subtracted 25.1 percent (-23.3 percent in Q1).

Slower growth rates were recorded in household spending (3.1 percent from 7.2 percent in Q1) and government consumption (8.9 percent from 13.2 percent). In contrast, gross fixed capital formation (4 percent from 3.6 percent) and inventories (2.1 percent from 1 percent) rose further. Net external trade contributed positively to the GDP, as exports went up 5.7 percent (vs 10.6 percent in Q1) and imports increased at a softer 4.2 percent (vs 13.3 percent in Q1).

India Q1 GDP Growth Slows to 5-Year Low

The Indian economy advanced 5.8 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2019, slowing from a 6.6 percent expansion in the previous period and missing market expectations of 6.3 percent. It was the weakest growth rate since the first quarter of 2014, amid weaker consumer demand and fixed investment.

India GDP Grows Less than Expected in Q4

The Indian economy advanced 6.6 percent year-on-year in the last three months of 2018, below a downwardly revised 7 percent expansion in the previous period and market expectations of 6.9 percent. It is the lowest growth rate in five quarters, due to a slowdown in both private and public expenditure, manufacturing and agriculture.

India GDP Growth Slows More than Anticipated

The Indian economy advanced 7.1 percent year-on-year in the third quarter of 2018, well below 8.2 percent in the previous period and market expectations of 7.4 percent. It is the lowest growth rate in three quarters, mainly due to a slowdown in consumer spending amid high oil prices and a weaker rupee. Also, inventories, financial services, manufacturing and the farm sector rose less.

India GDP Growth Highest in Over 2 Years

The Indian economy grew 8.2 percent year-on-year in the second quarter of 2018, above 7.7 percent in the previous three months and beating market expectations of 7.6 percent. It is the strongest growth rate since the first quarter of 2016, boosted by household spending, financial, real estate and manufacturing activities.

Source: NITIAAYOG Report, Published on 2019-05-31

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THINK TANK FOR DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES OF INDIA

Objectives India should be among the top 50 countries in the Global Innovation Index by 2022-23.

2000 National Innovation Foundation was set up to fund grassroots innovations and 2013 Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) Policy formulated. In addition the government has set up the Atal Innovation Mission (AIM) to transform radically the innovation, entrepreneurship and start-up ecosystem of the country.

The adoption of indigenous innovations by Indian industry is not very encouraging. Frequent violation of Preferential Market Access (PMA) is an issue leading to large-scale imports of foreign products and services.

The government has taken several initiatives to promote manufacturing. Among these are the Make in India Action Plan aimed at increasing the manufacturing sector's contribution to 25 per cent of GDP by 2020,² the Start-up India initiative to promote entrepreneurship and nurture innovation, and the Micro Units Development and Refinance Agency (MUDRA) and Stand-up India to facilitate access to credit. It has also undertaken massive recapitalization of public sector banks³ to ease availability of credit to micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Besides, it has undertaken major infrastructure projects, such as the setting up of industrial corridors, to boost manufacturing and the development strategy should help achieve broad-based economic growth to ensure balanced development across all regions and states and across sectors. This implies embracing new technologies fostering innovation and upskilling. We will have to focus on the necessary modernization of our agriculture and mainstreaming of regions such as the North East, hilly states and the 115 Aspirational Districts. The direct outcome of this will be improved regional and inter-personal equity and elimination of dualism that has so far characterised our economy. We will put in place an economy that is predominantly formal, rule-driven and facilitates investment and innovation.

SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA AND DEVELOPMENT: PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS

In the process of conceptual ideation of social entrepreneurship in India, many academic efforts has been done.

Social entrepreneurship is a combining concept that demonstrates the usefulness of business (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Roundy, 2014; **Ratiu et al., 2014**; Chell et al., 2014) principles in achieving sustainable social goals. Social enterprises involved in creating positive social outcomes (Agrawal and Hockerts, 2013) for marginalized or separated communities who are facing day-to-day survival challenges.

The practices of social entrepreneurship are motivated by a passion to help, empower and revive the social, environmental (Migliore et al., 2015) and economic challenges. Finally, their output comes out with a net social benefit. Their prime objective is to offer a better service (Gawell and Sundin, 2014)

for improving the populace as a whole. The Social entrepreneurial practices for making social impact that might outweigh the economic impact and display high social and economic proclivity (Maclean and Harvey, 2013). The practices play role of catalyst for empowerment and social inclusion (Huang and Cox, 2014; Rymysza, 2015). Through income generation projects and experimental learning and Learning by doing processes, they play a role of community entrepreneur for resource mobilization (Sloan et al., 2014).

It has been largely discussed that many issues are not summarized in the field of social entrepreneurship (Hati and Idris, 2014). Conceptual factors are the key aspects for the development of any domain in a specific discipline; this chapter is focused on the identified established factors leading to the development of social entrepreneurship (Goncalves et al., 2015) and potential conceptual framework (Kidd et al., 2014; Agrawal and Hockerts, 2013; **Kidd and McKenzie, 2014**) that will surely enrich the discipline.

Prospects of Social Entrepreneurship

- Choice for persons with Will-Power and Determination to change the Status-quo
- Opportunity for Personal Welfare and Social Transformation
- Integration of Marginalised Groups
- Viable Option for Achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDG)
- Excellent Mobilisers of Social Capital
- Creation of Services which otherwise would not have existed
- Collaborative Partnership with Governments

Problems of Social Entrepreneurship

- Financial Sustainability
- Organisational Effectiveness
- Leadership and team building

Social impact and entrepreneurship is deeply rooted in the Indian ethos. Some of the major historical milestones in the social enterprise sector in India are evident with time. Although debt is a major source of capital for many SEs, access to institutional debt (such as bank loans) is limited. With improving access to equity financing, access to institutional debt is also expected to improve over the next few years.

In order to sustain their growth, SEs need to access mainstream capital. Investor interest is gradually increasing as early investors are starting to see returns, and high growth is seen across sectors. SEs that are successful both from profitability and impact points of view now exist across key sectors.

Today the emergence of Social Entrepreneurship (A social change initiative) can make a large difference for sustainability. Leadership for social change through social entrepreneurship may meet the needs of lacking fields of human resource development and economic growth. This demands us for the need of working with the idea of educating emerging leaders in the Indian context for sustainable development. In the same way it may enable the government for policy innovation and will enhance the social change leaders for implementation of their creative ideas.

Many countries and research oriented organizations have started working on Social Entrepreneurship. It feels now to innovate the education pattern to make every steps of human resource development, be socially justifiable which may contribute for sustainable development of any country.

Social Entrepreneurship starts as a social enterprise which makes a socially profit making organization and the social entrepreneurs explore their leadership trades to facilitate the unattainable resources mainly human resources for human development. Social entrepreneurs have increasingly

garnered more attention because of their value to governments, corporations, and individuals. Especially during times of economic decline, the need for such entrepreneur is crucial because many local communities need a social revival as much as they need economic development.

University Grants Commission also sanctioned many projects to the universities to work on “Social Entrepreneurship”. The pioneer of many courses in India, Indira Gandhi National Open University has also started many courses in this field, recently one of the very important one is Master in Business Administration in Social Entrepreneurship. IIMs have also taken initiative and established Social Entrepreneurship cell.

CONCLUSION

Although debt is a major source of capital for many SEs, access to institutional debt (such as bank loans) is limited. With improving access to equity financing, access to institutional debt is also expected to improve over the next few years.

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COMPRATIVE STUDY OF JOINT-NUCLEAR FAMILY SCHOOL CHILDREN OF DIFFERENT BIRTH ORDER ON EXTRAVERSION

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ABSTARCT

The study was undertaken to study of different birth order on extroversion among subjects to joint and nuclear families boys and girls having rural and urban background which was conducted in Madhubani and Darbhanga districts of Bihar (India). The sample of the study comprised of 400 subjects (200 boys and 200 girls). 200 subjects belonging to joint families and 200 belonging to nuclear families. 200 subjects belonging to rural areas and 200 subjects belonging to urban areas were randomly selected in class VII. Junior Eysenck Personality Inventory has been originally developed by Eysenck&Eysenck (1964) and Personal data sheet has been developed by the research scholar. Having collected the data through the questionnaire schedule, the data were tabulated according to the procedure for statistical treatment. The results revealed that rural first born boys of joint family were significantly more extrovert than urban later born boys of joint family later born rural boys as well as girls of nuclear family. The later born girls of urban nuclear family were significantly more extrovert than later born boys and girls of urban joint family, and later boys and girls of rural nuclear families. However, significant difference has been found between the groups of girls and boys as t-value is found statistically significant beyond 0.05 and 0.01 levels.

In our society, for instance when people talk about their families, they usually mean a joint and nuclear family. The joint family may be preferred by people who desire more frequent contacts, greater cooperation, and closer relationship with relatives. The joint family forms had and have more in Indian society in which grandparents, two or more parents and their children live together, work together, but the joint families have also various problems. Interpersonal conflicts may exists. The joint family unit has greater economic need than small unit. But in American societies when people talk about their “families” they usually have in mind a nuclear family, a unit of composed of the husband, wife and children. Most people in American societies prefer to live in nuclear family. In contrast, various societies have or had the extended family as their ideal family pattern. In these societies many people do not be in such household, whether by choice or economy necessity. In recent decades very few societies including India, has significant proportions (over 20%) of their populations living in extended family arrangement (Burch, 1967). Some people believe that extended

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families were common at one time in our society.

Studies have been conducted on Extroversion/Introversion and degree of neuroticism on Engineers, doctors, teacher and adolescents and by the authors like – Jang et al. (1996); Costa and McCrae (1994) et. al. But very few studies been conducted on children belonging to joint and nuclear families, rural and urban background and boys and girls birth order on extraversion. Eysenck suggested that extraversion is an outward directed personality orientation characterized by sociability, activity and interest in the public environment rather than inner directed attitudes and interests. He has many friends, needs to have people to talk and does not like study by himself. He craves excitement; takes chance often sticks his neck out; act on the spur of the movement and is generally an impulsive individual. He is fond of practical jokes, always has a ready answer and generally likes change, he is care free, easy going, and optimistic and likes to “laugh and be merry”. He prefers to keep moving and doing things, tends to be aggressive and lose his temper quickly, altogether his feelings are not kept under tight control and he is not always a reliable person.

Adler, Freud and Jung suggested that birth order influences personality. He argued that birth order can leave an indelible impression on an individual style of life, which is one's habitual way of dealing with the task of friendship, love and work. According to Adler first born are “dethroned” when a second child comes along, and this loss of perceived privilege and primary may have a lasting influence on them. Middle children may feel ignored or over looked, causing them to develop the so called middle child syndrome. Younger and only children may be pampered and spoiled, which was suggested to affect their later personalities (Adler, 1964). One modern theory of personality states that the big five personality's traits of Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism represent most of the important elements of personality that can be measured. Contemporary empirical research shows that birth order does not influence the big five personalities traits (Rohrer, Egloff, Schmukle, Stefan).

Aims and objective of the present study

Aims and objective of the study, as well as its methodological dimensions are as follows the study had been proposed to ascertain the effects of structural and functional dimensions of family on the development of personality traits in children. Thus family structure (joint and nuclear family) was considered as independent variables and personality traits (extroversion/birth order) were considered as dependent variables. In this context following hypothesis were formulated :

1. First born boys of joint family would be more extrovert than subjects of other groups.
2. The rural later born boys of joint family were found to be more extrovert than urban later born boys and girls of nuclear family..

Definition of Variables:

Joint Family:

Joint family in this study will refer to a family in which parents, grand-parents, uncles, aunts and cousins live together.

Nuclear Family:

Nuclear family in this study will refer to family in which only parents and their children live.

Rural Areas:

Rural areas in this study refer to the areas that do not lie within the municipal limits.

Urban Areas:

Urban areas in this study refer to the areas lie within the municipal limits.

Extraversion:

Extraversion is a personality type based on particular neural structures which cause a rapid development reactive inhibition, strong inhibition and a slow dissipation of inhibition. The neurotic form of extraversion is seen as hysteric symptoms (Eysenck 1961).

Birth order :

Birth order defined as an individual's rank by age among siblings, has long been of interest to psychologists as well as lay-people. Much of the fascination has focused on the possible role of birth order in shaping on personality and behavior.

Methodology :

Sample

The sample comprised rural boys $19+31=50$ (first-later born) of joint family, rural boys $14+36=50$ (first-later born)of nuclear family, rural girls $11+39=50$ (first-later born)of joint family and rural girls $9+41=50$ (first-later born)of nuclear family. Similarly a comparative group of urban boys $11+39=50$ (first-later born)of joint family, urban boys $11+39=50$ (first-later born)of nuclear family and girls $18+32=50$ (first-later born)of urban joint family and $5+45=50$ urban girls nuclear family. Thus, altogether 400 students studying class VII of rural and urban high schools were selected randomly. The school under study was located in Madhubani and Darbhanga districts of Bihar. The age range of children was 11-13 years with mean age of 12.0 years.

Tools used :

1. Personal data sheet has been developed by research scholar.
2. The Junior Eysenck Personality Inventory (J. E. P. I) has been developed by Eysenck&Eysenck (1964).

Procedure :

The above mentioned tools in printed form were administered on middle school children (boys and girls) as per the instructions given the manual. After tabulating the data, the data were given statistical treatment to test the hypothesis.

Result and discussion :

In order to test the hypothesis that first born boys of joint family would be most extrovert than subjects of other the observed data was further analyzed to see the effect of birth order on extroversion traits of personality. Such decision was taken because of the fact that birth order has been found to be significant factor influencing individual's social and personality traits as Singh &Sinha (1988) found that first born had a significantly higher mean acceptance score than the second born child. Khatri& Gupta (1988) found that first born improved better under positive reinforcement as compared to negative reinforcement, and last born improved better under negative reinforcement as compared to positive reinforcement. Gupta (1986) found that last born subjects were more Machiavellian followed by first and middle born subjects.

Thus for the purpose of statistical analysis data were tabulated according to family structure, sex, locale and birth order of the subjects, and mean extroversion scores of these groups were compared through t-ratio. The obtained results are presented in Table – 1

Comparison of Mean Extroversion scores of subjects of Different Birth order

Table - 1

Family	Group	N	Mean	SD	SE	2	3	4	5	6	t ratio 7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Joint family	1.Rural First-Born Boys	19	16.11	1.91	0.44	1.74	1.20	1.13	0.42	1.80	2.70**	1.98	0.27	1.96	0.61	1.46	3.56**	2.72	1.81	0.00
	2.Rural First-Born Girls	11	14.91	1.76	0.53		0.33	0.30	1.31	0.21	0.66	0.14	0.40	0.75	0.38	0.75	1.43	0.54	0.06	0.00
	3.Urban First-Born Boys	11	14.45	4.34	1.31			0.48	0.99	0.44	0.01	0.40	1.06	0.21	0.54	0.40	0.37	0.08	0.36	0.00
	4.Urban First-Born Girls	18	15.17	3.01	0.71				0.79	0.15	0.87	0.22	0.88	0.91	0.15	0.87	1.50	0.76	0.26	0.00
Nuclear family	5.Rural later-Born Boys	31	15.84	2.68	0.48					1.27	2.61*	1.42	0.13	1.66	0.42	1.29	2.97**	2.10*	1.33	0.00
	6.Rural later-Born Girls	39	15.05	2.52	0.40						1.02	0.09	1.40	0.93	0.90	0.28	0.85	1.91	0.16	0.00
	7.Urban Later- Born Boys	39	14.46	2.68	0.43							0.98	2.26*	0.35	0.80	0.50	0.87	0.18	0.77	0.00
	8.Urban Later- Born Girls	32	15.00	1.98	0.35								1.55	0.90	0.58	0.82	1.94	0.86	0.09	0.00
	9.Rural First-Born Boys	14	15.93	1.82	0.49									1.75	0.50	1.35	3.06**	2.21*	1.44	0.00
	10.Rural First-Born Girls	9	14.11	2.76	0.92										0.90	0.27	0.17	0.45	0.82	0.00
	11.Urban First-Born Boys	11	15.36	3.44	1.04											0.90	1.27	0.73	0.36	0.00
	12.Urban First-Born Girls	5	13.60	3.71	1.66												0.20	0.56	0.78	0.00
	13.Rural later- Born Boys	36	13.94	2.50	0.42													1.09	1.60	0.00
	14.Rural later- Born Girls	41	14.56	2.46	0.38														0.65	0.00
	15.Urban later-Born Boys	39	14.95	2.92	0.47															0.00
	16. Urban Later- Born Girls	45	16.09	2.57	0.38															0.00

* Significant beyond 0.05 level

** Significant beyond 0.01 level

An inspection of Table – 1 would make it clear that rural first born boys of joint family were significantly more extrovert than urban later born boys of joint family later born rural boys as well as girls of nuclear family. The last born girls of urban nuclear family were significantly more extrovert than later born boys and girls of urban joint family, and later boys and girls of rural nuclear family. The rural later born boys of joint family were found to be more extrovert than urban later born boys and girls of nuclear family. Rural first born boys of nuclear family were more extrovert than urban later born boys of joint family. Similarly, rural first born boys of nuclear families were more extrovert than rural later born boys and girls of nuclear families.

The results clearly indicated that rural first born boys of nuclear and joint families and urban later born girls of nuclear families were more extrovert than subjects of other groups. This results can be explained in terms of magnitude of social support received by these two groups of subjects. It is general seen that firstborn boys do receive a lot of love, affection and interaction by the members of the family and outside family. Similarly later or last born girls are very dear to the parents because they are very much serviceable to parents and elders. This is why the children of these two categories are more extrovert than those of other categories.

CONCLUSION

In the light of the results obtained and interpretation of the following conclusion are drawn:

1. First born boys of rural joint family and later born girls of urban nuclear family were found to

- be more extrovert than others.
2. The later born girls of urban nuclear family were significantly more extrovert than later born boys and girls of urban joint family, and later boys and girls of rural nuclear family.
 3. Rural first born boys of nuclear families were more extrovert than rural later born boys and girls of nuclear families.

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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION VIS-À-VIS RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: INTERRELATION BETWEEN THE DOCTRINES

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ABSTARCT

The present paper is asincere attempt to highlight the major considerations of the Indian Government such as Eradicating black money, Removing Counterfeit Currency, Stopping money laundering activities, Fighting corruption and moving towards cashless or less cash economy behind the move of demonetization and past national and international experiences of the demonetization move. This paper also discusses the impact of demonetization on the common man, especially in the context of Elderly and it's Economic/Financial, Social, Health related and Psychologically impact on elderly.

Keywords : *Demonetization, Elderly, National and International Experiences, Paper Currencies, Impact on Elderly.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The conceptual frameworks and theoretical components which comprise humanitarian intervention (Hereinafter referred as HI) and the responsibility to protect (Hereinafter referred as R2P) are equally varied and similar in their construction. These differences and similarities naturally extend beyond the actual conceptualisation of each theory and are manifest in the debates which concern them. When focusing precisely upon the actual debates surrounding HI and R2P, it becomes apparent the two are far more similar concerning the notion of intervening militarily than key architects of the latter doctrine. When the ICISS published its R2P thesis in 2001, it did so with the intention of completely reinvigorating the static, mishap laden doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention; whilst simultaneously responding to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's challenge on how the international community is to balance its response to human rights violations with a legal obligation of non-interference within a sovereign territory. From a third world perspective, deconstructing the debates within the on-going dialogue on military intervention in each concept demonstrates, more often than not, that both run into the same set of moral and legal dilemmas, despite the conceptual and theoretical differences between the two. On the otherhand, the emphasis on conflict prevention under the R2P doctrine conjures further debates which are unique to its conceptual framework and therefore distinguishes it from HI. Ultimately though, as Peltonen argues, both frameworks essentially argue for the same thing— international security - but approach their subject matter “from two different worldviews.” In the section that follows, a range of arguments within both doctrines will be paralleled to demonstrate how HI and R2P debates concerning military intervention, are invariably centred upon the same premises, and therefore run into the same dilemmas. These debates concern issues of sovereignty, the possibilities of abuse and the issue of who should act in times of crisis. In the subsequent section, the debate that states may utilize R2P rhetoric to legitimate their decision not to

* Peltonen, H., *International Responsibility and Grave Humanitarian Crises: Collective Provision for Human Security*, 26 (Routledge, London, 2013)

act in times of crisis will be shown to differentiate the doctrine from traditional HI. Furthermore, the former framework's emphasis on conflict prevention will demonstrate why it is important to distinguish between HI and R2P.

2. CONCEPT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

2.1. Meaning and Definition

The simplest meaning of humanitarian intervention can be said to be that the intervention by a state on the ground of protecting human rights of the concerned masses existing in another state. Oppenheim observed that when denial of the fundamental human rights by a state to its national takes place, which shocks the conscience of the mankind, then in such a situation it becomes imperative for other state to intervene. Such a situation limits the violator state's right as a sovereign and therefore intervention becomes justifiable.²

Alan J. Kuperman gives a very broad interpretation to the term humanitarian intervention as he includes in his definition not only military intervention but also other two sanctions given under Chapter VII of the United Nations (Hereinafter referred as UN) Charter.³ But another profound scholar of international law, P.H. Winfield explains it in terms of using of force and thereby limits the scope of intervention to the military intervention only.⁴ Again when we look into the general meaning of the term 'Humanitarian Intervention' it conforms to the idea of Winfield.⁴ Further, other scholars of international law have also limited the scope of the term to use of force⁶ or depict it as a method of penetrating sovereignty.⁷

From the above mentioned attributes of humanitarian intervention it can be understood as an act of intervention on the ground of protection of human rights. It refers to the dependency upon the coercive mode for the reasonable objective of protecting the people residing in another state as well as preventing the grave violations of basic human rights carried on by such state or the arbitrary acts of such state who was expected to protect fundamental human rights of its nationals.

2.2. Kinds of Humanitarian Intervention

Humanitarian Intervention can be divided into two broad categories on two grounds – on the ground of authority and on the ground of number of interveners. On the ground of authority there can be two kinds of humanitarian intervention i.e. authorized and non-authorized interventions. An authoritative intervention refers to those humanitarian interventions which are authorized by

2. Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts KCMG QC (eds.), *Oppenheim's international law* 442 (Pearson Education Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, 2003)

3. Alan J. Kuperman observed that- "humanitarian intervention is the use of diplomatic, economic, and military resources by one or more states or international organizations intended primarily to protect civilians who are endangered in another state. These civilians may be at risk either from natural disaster or from political violence (including war) in which they are targeted deliberately or suffer from the resulting social disruption."; Michael Goodhart (ed.), *Human Rights: Politics & Practice*, 335 (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009)

4. According to P.H. Winfield- "Traditional doctrine of humanitarian intervention recognized the right of a state to use force against another state for the purpose of protecting its nationals from inhuman treatment."; Manoj Kumar Sinha, "Is Humanitarian Intervention Permissible in International Law" 40 *JILI* 66 (2000)

5. According to Oxford Dictionary- "Humanitarian intervention can briefly be described as the interference of one or more states in the domestic affairs of another state by means of armed forces, with the intention of making that state adopt a more humanitarian policy"; J. A. Khamasi, "Humanitarian Intervention and Promotion of Democracy" 3 *KLJ* 41 (2009)

6. According to Farrokh Jhabvala- "Humanitarian intervention means coercive action by states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its government and it may be with or without the authorization from the Security Council for the purposes of preventing massive violations of human rights or international humanitarian law"; P.N. Premsy, "Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention under International Law" 27 *CULR* 386 (2003)

7. According to Stanely Hoffman- "Humanitarian intervention is intervention on behalf of human rights transcending sovereignty."

the United Nations Security Council (Hereinafter referred as UNSC). Whereas the non-authorized humanitarian intervention are the intervention which are not sanctioned by the UNSC. Another broad category is the number of intervening state which can be further bifurcated into two sorts of interventions- unilateral and collective interventions. Unilateral interventions refer to those interventions which are carried out by single state. Contrary to this in case of collective interventions more than one state intervenes into the domestic affairs of another state where the human rights violations is or about to take place.

While defining the term 'Humanitarian Intervention' various scholars have asserted the fact that these interventions involve military actions only. So, it can be said that military interventions are one of the forms of Humanitarian intervention. Other forms of Humanitarian interventions that are referred by the scholars while giving a wide interpretation to the act of humanitarian intervention - diplomatic and economic Humanitarian Interventions. In order to coerce another state for the purpose of protecting human rights of inhabitants of such state, a state may also make use of its diplomatic & economic resources and then resort to military action as a last resort.

3. Concept of Responsibility to Protect

3.1 Meaning and Definition:

The emergence of the responsibility to protect principle can be traced from the report prepared by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The ICISS report was prepared in the year 2001 titled as "*A Responsibility to Protect*". This report was prepared with the objective to engage with the issues of grave contravention of fundamental human rights as well as the concept of non-intervention and sovereignty. Under the report, the primary responsibility to protect the fundamental human rights of the people is on the state to which the victims belong. It also provides that when the state is not able to protect its inhabitants or reluctant to do so then in such a situation the R2P shifts on to the other states of the international community. After the presentation of this report, the principle of R2P attained eminence in the international sphere and therefore acknowledged internationally. It gained so much significance that the General Assembly adopted this principle⁸ in order to recognize it in the year 2005 at the UN World Summit.⁹ It recognized the R2P against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In 2009 again the Secretary General of the UN Ban Ki-Moon in his report carved out the three components of this principle. The first component as suggested by him is that the principle of R2P is to be considered as the supportive of the principle of sovereignty and not contrary to it. He contended in his report that by abiding with the obligation under the R2P principle, the state should consider it as the part of the enhancing of their sovereignty and not as some burden. The second component emphasized on the scope of this principle in the sense that the obligation to protect should be limited to be used against the specified acts of aggression only, such as crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. It should not be used against the trivial matters of violations of human rights. The last component suggests that though the scope of R2P is limited but its practice should be profound. To fulfil R2P, the Secretary General suggested an expensive support measures and responses.

The Convention on Genocide¹⁰ also imposes the responsibility, to prevent and punish the act of

8. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on The Responsibility to Protect at Sixty-third session (7 October 2009)

9. Para 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly in September (2005)

genocide, on the concerned state in which the violations are taking place. Similarly, the Geneva Convention along with its additional protocols deals indirectly with the standard responsibility during war. International law such as Rome Statute of the ICC also defines the elements of crime against which the R2P exists.

3.2. Elements:

R2P gives a three dimensional approach to solving a problem at an international level, firstly Responsibility to Prevent i.e. How to control a situation before it culminates into a Crises? ; Secondly, Responsibility to React i.e. How to control a situation after it could not be prevented? And; Lastly, Responsibility to Rebuild i.e. How to rebuild a state after the intervention is over?

Of these, Responsibility to Prevent is the most desirable as it tends to deescalate a conflict into negotiations and does not give a chance for something to become a conflict in the first place. Usually the tools available under Chapter VI of UN Charter are applied.

3.3. Yardstick as to Military Action:

The R2P provides the yardstick as to when the most drastic measure, military action, would be employed. The legal criterion dealt with the decision that

Security Council was the body that could take decision. The legitimacy criteria were the seriousness of the threat, Motivation for military strike, whether peaceful alternatives were available, proportionality of response and balance of Consequences.¹¹

In relation to the establishment of criteria for action by the R2P, there has been commendation of the new doctrine and even the claim that this is “the more significant contribution of the Commission's report” as it creates “a spectrum of action for the international community – prevention, non-military coercion, military action, and post-conflict rebuilding”.¹²

In the international scenario, the establishment of criteria is relevant when both the international community is willing to act “as a way to limit possible abuses” and it is unwilling to act “as a standard to push for action”.¹³ In light of this view, the establishment of criteria by the R2P could also be commended since this could minimize the selectivity in relation to humanitarian crisis. Once again, however, there may be found some problems in the doctrine being proposed.

However, on the one hand, the proposed criterion is not always theoretically sufficient for the broad terms of the R2P because it does not allow for precise and clear standards of application and due to this reason, it may lead to selectivity.

To illustrate the view, the ICISS did not define “large scale loss of life” or “a failed state”, that are the core terms of its just cause threshold. In this sense, it did not appear to have aided for establishing practical criteria through this doctrine as it had proposed to do. On the other hand, it appeared to have extricated the broader human rights issue in the earlier doctrines of humanitarian intervention. In relation to these, the ICISS controversially provided that “there will be no difference of opinions in practice of what is a situation demanding action, minimising thus the relevance of theoretical criteria”.¹⁴

There is also possibility of some criticism on the question of 'right authority' against R2P. This is

10. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948

11. Gareth Evans, *Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All* 39-43 (Washington D.C. Brooking Institutions Press, 2008)

12. Liliana L. Jubilut, “Has the 'Responsibility to Protect' Been a Real Change in Humanitarian Intervention? An Analysis from the Crisis in Libya” 14 *Int'l Comm. L. Rev.* 309 (2012)

13. Philip Alston, “International Human Rights Course” New York University School of Law (28 Oct. 2005).

14. *Supra* note 12 at 324.

due to the issue that though the ICISS stated the proposal of some alternatives for the inaction of the SC that are essential to make certain of the responsibility of the SC in the face of its inaction but these alternatives do not solve the legal or legitimacy problems of inaction by the SC when the use of force is needed for humanitarian purposes.¹⁵

First of all, according to the ICISS, the GA could act under the “Uniting for Peace” precedent and it has to be said that although it can deliberate on the matter it cannot authorize the use of force or enforce its decisions, which in practice means that a humanitarian intervention cannot be undertaken by the GA and thus, inaction would still exist even against the view of the majority of the international community.

Secondly, regarding regional organizations that could act within their jurisdictions subjected to a post-facto SC authorization. Here, the proposal is also complicated in terms of legitimacy for “(i) authorisation normally should be asked before the act is realised and (ii) until the authorisation is granted the action remains in a limbo not being legal but having the possibility of acquiring this status”.¹⁶ However, although Article 53 of the UN Charter states that enforcement action by regional organizations require authorization by the SC, there is no mention of the need of such authorization being a priori, which means that in terms of legality the proposal by the ICISS did not poses a problem in relation to the UN Charter.

Thirdly, regarding the SC although the ICISS maintained that the veto power should only be used in the time of the questions being dealt with vital interests to one of the permanent members but in practice, the definition of vital interest means that action would still be at the mercy of the five permanent members.

In relation to the process in which the intervention should occur, the ICISS proposed that a code of conduct should exist. This is a positive aspect of the new doctrine since it would create accountability mechanisms for the intervening forces and increase the respect for humanitarian international law.

Therefore, it will enhance the legitimacy and legality of the actions being taken. To all the above, it can be said that in the doctrinal aspects, the real changes brought by the responsibility to react in the R2P are debatable that makes the analysis of the practical aspects of the doctrine much more relevant.

3.4. Three Pillars of Responsibility to Protect:

According to Secretary General, R2P has three uniformly important and parallel pillars.¹⁷ The first is that, it is the primary responsibility of a State to protect people under its purview from the crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The next pillar talks about the responsibility which every member state of the international community has to comply with. It manifests the obligation of other states to assist the state who acts under its R2P. The last pillar stated by the Secretary General was said to be the most controversial amongst them all. It emphasized on the collective action taken up at the right time and effectively by the international community in case of the failure of the concerned state in protecting the human rights of its inhabitants. This collective action is referred to be taken under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The ICISS Report which explained the wider perspective of the principle of R2P inclusive of the responsibilities to prevent, react and rebuild¹⁸ have not gained much importance

15. Ibid.

16. Supra Note 17

17. Norm consisting of three main “pillars,” articulated by the Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (2005)

as the conception of the three pillars suggested by the Secretary General Ban Ki-Boon.

4. Positive international law:

The positive international law relating to the use of force can be divided into three segments – the international law restricting the use of force, the international law allowing the use of force and general principles of international law relating to use of force. The first segment includes few provisions of the UN Charter as well as of the International Humanitarian Law. Following provisions of UN Charter directly or indirectly restricts or prohibits the use of force in international community -

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides that – “*All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.*”

Other provisions relevant to the discussion are as follows - Article 2(3) of the UN Charter provides that – “*All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.*”¹⁹

Article 2(7) of the UN Charter provides that – “*Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.*”²⁰ Article 2(7) of the UN Charter invokes the conventional practice of non-intervention. The term 'intervention' has been used in a wider sense in the said provision of the UN Charter.²¹ The broader interpretation of 'intervention' includes even the general recommendations and resolutions of the UN regarding the matters within a state in order to direct the actions of such state to act in a prescribed manner. UN's approach towards the interpretation of the term 'intervention' is still ambiguous because whenever it refuses the invocation of Article 2(7), the question regarding whether the concerned act cannot be considered as interference or regarded as “essentially within the jurisdiction of the state”, remain unanswered. This particular provision neither provide extensive explanation of the term 'intervention' nor give clarification of what would amount to “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction”. Therefore, it can be interpreted broadly as well as politically in the sense that sometimes even if the concerned matter has no bearing on the international peace and security; it may be treated as an international issue by any state. This is how any domestic matter of a particular state has a tendency of becoming an international affair. Whether a matter within a state has international or national bearing is to be decided by the organ of the UN as the jurisdiction of interpreting the provisions of Charter lies with them. So, it is not the International Court of Justice (ICJ)²² only who has the jurisdiction in relation to any matters relating to interpretation of the provisions of UN Charter. Nonetheless, the UNSC and UN General Assembly can ask for the opinion in the name of advisory opinion from the ICJ. The ICJ itself has upheld this jurisdiction of the organs of the UN.²³

The provision of International Humanitarian law provides for the non-intervention. Article 3 of

18. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) Report on The Responsibility to Protect, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, (2001) available at [http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/ Commission-Report.pdf](http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf) (last visited 9th Nov. 2017).

19. The UN Charter, 1945

20. The UN Charter, 1945

21. Danish Institute of International Affairs Report on Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and political aspects (1999)

22. Article 96 of the UN Charter

23. Danish Institute of International Affairs Report on Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and political aspects (1999)

the Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions²⁴ states that –

(1) *Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government, by all legitimate means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State.*

(2) *Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory of which that conflict occurs.*²⁵

The customary international law also recognizes the principle of non-intervention. The principle of non-intervention is said to be the by-product of the one of the most acclaimed and acknowledged principles of international law i.e. the Principle of Sovereignty.²⁶ The UN General Assembly has also time and again acknowledged this principle of non-intervention for instance in 1965 and 1970.²⁷ The 1970 Declaration affirms that “...*that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international issues.*”²⁸ This Declaration provided 7 principles relating to non-intervention. The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (1981) also dealt extensively with the principle of non-intervention.²⁹ It has also been confirmed as the customary law by the International Court of Justice.³⁰

The second broad category or segment of positive international law regarding intervention is the international law allowing the use of force. Under UN Charter, Article 51 and Chapter VII are considered to be the exception to the general rule of prohibition on use of force.³¹ Article 2(7) of the UN Charter incorporates three essential guidelines as to the use of force.³² The first guideline

24. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977.

25. Article 3 commentaries available at <https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=92D729DEE6F594C8C12563CD0043A04C> (last visited on 9th Nov. 2017)

26. Ian Hurd, “Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World” 25 E. Int. IA. 298 (2011)

27. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty (1965), General Assembly Resolution no. 2131 (XX), adopted by 109 votes, with one abstinence; The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of UN (1970), General Assembly Resolution no. 2625 (XXV) adopted without a vote; The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (1981), General Assembly Resolution no. 36/103 adopted by 120 votes, with 6 abstentions.

28. Ibid

29. The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (1981): “No State or group of States has the right to intervene or interfere in any form or for any reason whatsoever in the internal and external affairs of other States.”

30. Corfu Channel Case ICJ Reports 1949, p. 35 ; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) ICJ Reports 1986, para. 202: “The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its affairs without outside interference; though examples of trespass against this principle are not infrequent, the Court considers that it is part and parcel of customary international law. As the Court has observed: “Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations” (I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 35), and international law requires political integrity also to be respected. Expressions of an opinio juris regarding the existence of the principle of non-intervention in customary international law are numerous and not difficult to find.”

governs the acts of the organs of the UN in the sense that it obligates them to value the sovereignty of all the states and not interfere in their domestic affairs. The second guideline incorporated in the Article 2(7) specifies obligation for the members of the UN. It upholds that the members of the UN should not refer any domestic matters of a state to the international forum i.e. UN. Such matters as considered to be essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of another state are not to be settled by the UN. UN has no power to settle a dispute which consists the internal affairs of a state because such affairs do not have any relation to the international law. The last guideline describes that there lies an exception to the general rule of non-intervention i.e. measures taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In other words the use of force as enforcement measures by UNSC under Chapter VII of the Charter acts as an exception to the law of non-intervention. Article 2(4) of the Charter is considered to be a complete prohibition against the intervention subject to the right of self-defence and intervention by UNSC under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The right of self-defence is stipulated under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The said provision explains the individual as well as collective self-defence. The provision reads as follows –

Article 51 of the UN Charter: *“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”*³³

From analysing the above provision, it can be said that there are two criteria which have to be fulfilled for use of force to fall under the right of self-defence under Article 51. The two criteria which make an intervention an act of self-defence are – armed attack and failure of the UNSC to take measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. The right of self-defence should be used out of necessity and not choice. It should be used in response of an armed attack. There is no rule in customary international law permitting another State to exercise the right of collective self-defence on the basis of its own assessment of the situation. Where collective self-defence is invoked, it is to be expected that the State for whose benefit this right is used will have declared itself to be the victim of an armed attack.³⁴ It is widely observed that the right of self-defence is pre-existing customary international law.

The said provision uses the words in a way that it suggests prima facie that the crisis is either taking place or has just taken place. Although it is also believed that the right of self-defence can be exercised also in cases of evidently inevitable armed attack which are considerably genuine. The legitimacy of such self-defence is also considered by the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which is a body created in 2003 with the aim of evaluating the international threats and making recommendations placed on the same.³⁵

31. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter provides that – “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”

32. MügeKinacıoğlu, “The Principle of the Non-intervention at the United Nations: The Charter Framework and the Legal Debate” P.S. 18 (2005)

33. Article 51 of the UN Charter, 1945

34. Nicaragua v. United States of America, para 195 and 196 I (ICJ) Reports, 27 June 1986, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4023a44d2.html> (last visited on 9th Nov. 2017)

The Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizes the UNSC to take measures regarding the threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.³⁶ The powers enshrined in the said chapter are pivotal to the UNSC's capacity to maintain international peace and security by exercising such powers to end the ongoing strife. Under this Chapter, the UNSC is authorized to ascertain the existence of any threats to the international peace and security and in case if such threat appears to be real & genuine then it takes measures in order to prevent the same.³⁷ This chapter renders the UNSC a way of escape from the absolute principle of international customary law of non-intervention enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The UNSC through its resolutions is empowered to take measures which could be either economic & diplomatic sanctions or the usage of military force to re-establish the international peace & security.³⁸ Notwithstanding its power under Chapter VII of the Charter the UNSC has failed many a times to deal with certain international conflicts that have taken place over a time whereas many a time it has also taken strong measures adequately in order to protect international stability and peace.

From the above discussion it can rightly be said that under the UN Charter intervention can be made on the humanitarian grounds but it can only be done by the members of UNSC collectively and not by other states. But the customary international law should also be looked into for determining state practices or principles of international law practiced generally by the states in course of their conduct as the Statute of ICJ also acknowledges the validity of international custom as a source of law.³⁹ The principle of non-intervention forms part of the customary international law and not the using of force by way of intervention. General principles relating to interventions are the criteria which are considered essential in order to make the intervention by a state legitimate such as just war principle and sovereignty as responsibility principle.⁴⁰

5. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION VIS-À-VIS RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

5.1 Correlation:

Article 2 (4) of the UN charter states that the threat or use of military force in a sovereign territory is prohibited, and that all members must respect “the political independence of all states.”⁴¹ From the conceptual outlines of the two frameworks, it is apparent how both may be interpreted as violations of this founding UN statute.

HI's primary focus on military force to alleviate mass suffering in the name of humanity is not sustained under any legal basis unless commissioned by all members of the UN Security Council. Thus, if state A threatened military action against state B for the latter's atrocities against its citizenry without Security Council authorisation, the former is essentially breaking international law. Similarly, despite the R2P doctrine's emphasis on the notion of prevention, it does undoubtedly leave room for military intervention if all other preventive measures are exhausted. Furthermore, the R2P framework, under the ICISS's original format, proposes regional organisations or actors maybe called upon to intervene when Security Council agreement stalls. In 2005, UN member states formally endorsed a watered down version of the original ICISS

35 Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (December 2, 2004) available at <https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instreetree/report.pdf> (last visited on 9th Nov. 2017)

36. The UN Charter, 1945

37. Article 39 of the UN Charter

38. Article 41 & 42 of the UN Charter

39. Article 38.1(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1946

40. Nicholas J wheeler, “legitimizing HI: principles and procedures” 2 Melb. J. Int.L. 550 (2001)

41. UN Charter, Article 2 (4) (available at <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/principles.shtml#rel2>)

report on R2P. Considering the report is not legally binding though, the problem of state sovereignty still pertains since there are no definitive rules on who should intervene when the core legal channels fail.

This glaring contradiction between the legality of the UN Charter and the morality of the two frameworks has created a degree of suspicion, particularly amongst third world states, as to the true orientation of international administration.⁴² Generally speaking, as products of decolonization, young, developing third world countries are suspicious of any emerging legal or moral norms centred upon a standardization of state practice. Such attempts to homogenise sovereignty harks back to “*a revival of the 'standard of civilization' yardstick that was used in the nineteenth century to justify colonial subjugation.*”⁴³ Given that some scholars go as far as to say the “*United States strives to dominate the world, for which end it is prepared to use any means necessary,*”⁴⁴ it is little wonder third world nations are less than enthusiastic in endorsing any emerging legal or moral norms which permit the overlooking of established international law for vague humanitarian causes. In addition, the formal legal channel of the Security Council is equally questionable considering its unrepresentative nature from a third world perspective. The possibility of a single veto from any of the permanent five in favour or against intervention casts an apprehensive shadow on the entire institution regarding humanitarian emergencies.⁴⁵ When compared to the ICISS's notion that the R2P doctrine should be able to transcend these very same legal channels when the Security Council fails to come to any agreement on possible interventions, it is only natural that from a third world perspective, such proposals are viewed as exactly the same as traditional HI. Thus, despite the ICISS's attempt to shift intervention discourse from a 'right' to a 'responsibility,' the R2P doctrine ultimately runs into the same issues of sovereignty as its conceptual cousin with regards to military intervention.

In conjunction with the issue of state sovereignty, the selectivity with which both frameworks have been employed by the permanent five to justify intervention have also contributed to the third world suspicion both HI and R2P are susceptible to abuse. Advocates for intervention have argued the misuse of the R2P doctrine can ultimately advance the emerging norm positively.⁴⁶ Badescu and Weiss argue the employment of the R2P doctrine by the USA,

France and Russia in Iraq, Burma and South Ossetia respectively, can set precedents for how the framework should operate in the future. Both scholars acknowledge that individually, each case presents either a misuse or an abuse of the philosophy; on the other hand, they maintain both “*application and misapplication...can foster a norm's advancement.*”⁴⁷ These arguments however, offer little respite to politically weak third world nations for whom military intervention offers a serious threat.

The issue of selectivity is nowhere more manifest than in the Middle East where international double standards have been most blatant. Saddam Hussein's Iraq was perpetually punished with

42. Ayoob, M., “Third World Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration” 10 *Global Governance*, 99 (2004)

43. Gong, G., in *Id.* at 101

44. Blum, W., “America's Deadliest Export – Democracy: The Truth About US Foreign Policy and Everything Else” 1 (Zed Books, London, 2014)

45. Ayoob, M., “Third World Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration” 10 *Global Governance*, 102 (2004)

46. Badescu, C.; Weiss, T., “Misrepresenting R2P and Advancing Norms: An Alternative Spiral?” 11 *International Studies Perspectives* 354 (2010)

47. *Id.* at 369

sanctions after the first Gulf War with Kuwait and then invaded for supposedly defying numerous Security Council Resolutions in 2003. Yet, on the other hand, Israel has undoubtedly defied countless Security Council resolutions for over thirty-five years without any consequence. Considering “global public opinion didn't force action to protect the Gaza Palestinians from Israel in January 2009,” for populations in Arab and Muslim states, Israel's protection under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and Iraq's subjugation under the same resolutions is a clear example of western double standards. This undermines the emergence of any humanitarian norm concerning responsible sovereigns in the third world, since the Security Council's failure to react to “the Palestinian issue makes the Council and the United States very vulnerable to the criticism that their concern for humanitarian issues is less than sincere.” Bellamy concurs with this view, arguing “*the Iraq war has undermined the standing of the United States and the U.K. as norm carriers.*” Couple these events with the Security Council's invocation of the R2P doctrine to intervene in Libya back in 2011, and the catastrophic events that followed and subsequently continue at the time of writing, it is only reasonable that question marks are raised whether either framework is worth implementing given the lack of general rules governing each over key issues of who specifically should intervene and when.

Answering these questions is a key parallel between the debates in both the HI and R2P frameworks. Scholars in both camps are at odds when it comes to precise, implementable instructions on who should act, when, and whether, under each framework they are actually obliged to act. In light of the discussion above, these questions are of central importance if any norm is to develop as a response to humanitarian crises. If debates surrounding these issues are unable to reach any formal consensus, then the above dilemma on sovereignty will continue to be problematic.

The question as to who should act raises a host of logistical issues concerning the geographic location of the emergency and those states within close proximity, resource availability and the political will of the obliged country to actually act. In addition to the possibility of abuse or misuse discussed earlier, these dilemmas have created a wealth of debate within both the HI and R2P frameworks. Drayton attempts to override these dilemmas by arguing that states which propose any form of collective action should first declare their political interests as well as seek international approval for the military tactics and weaponry to be employed. Though Drayton's argument may be criticized for being too ideational and simplistic when compared to the complex factors which have to be taken into account when deliberating over a possible intervention, ultimately, both frameworks are at best only able to offer Security Council

48. Ayoob, M., “Third World Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration” 10 *Global Governance*, 110-111 (2004)

49. *Id.* at 111

50. Herman, E.; Peterson, D., “The Responsibility to Protect, the International Criminal Court, and Foreign Policy in Focus: Subverting the UN Charter in the Name of Human Rights” (available at <http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2009/hp240809.html>)

51. *Ibid.*

52. Bellamy, A., “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention

53. *After Iraq* 19(2) *Ethics and International Affairs* 32 (September 2005)

54. Drayton, R., “Beyond Humanitarian Imperialism: The Dubious Origins of 'Humanitarian Intervention' and Some Rules for its Future” in Everill, B.; Kaplan, J (eds.), *The History and Practise of Humanitarian Intervention in Africa* 218 (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013)

55. *Id.* at 226

56. Glanville, L., “Ellery Stowell and the Enduring Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention” 13 *International Studies Review*, 241 (2011)

authorisation as a preferred first step to possible action. Given it was noted earlier that the unrepresentative nature and the lack of coherence in Security Council protocol undermines this channel of action from a third world perspective, this solution does not adequately address the key questions of who acts and when. The R2P framework does propose intervention may be possible through regional actors if the Security Council fails to agree on a course of action. However, considering this essay concerns the debates within both frameworks, Drayton's accusation that they represent nothing more than a form of neo-colonialism is legitimate from a third world perspective since debates in neither is able to give any affirmative solutions to these core logistical questions.

The inability to address these fundamental logistical questions on the notion of intervention in either framework also extends to the dilemma of obligation. As Glanville argues, the R2P doctrine, despite all the ICISS's rhetorical attempts to distance itself from traditional HI, still struggles to overcome the same issues of obligation as Ellery Stowell did in 1921 when considering the latter framework. Glanville argues a state's obligation to intervene in times of humanitarian crises in the R2P doctrine, parallel to Stowell's writings on HI, is never guaranteed to be discharged.

Stowell's notion that states possess more than a mere right to intervene in humanitarian emergencies but are morally obliged has clear parallels with the contemporary idea behind R2P. Stowell labelled this obligation "*imperfect*" due to the lack of efficient international legal mechanisms in place "*to compel states to take up the burden of enforcing the law.*" The unenforceability of the imperfect obligation under international law meant populations victim to state atrocities were forever at the mercy of the international community's discretion.

Thus, even though the UN 2005 World Summit Outcome is a clear example of how states are now more willing to bore this obligation under the R2P doctrine, the lack of concise, authoritative action taken in Darfur, Gaza and most recently Syria, demonstrate how little material progress has been made under either framework.

5.2. Contradiction:

Further consideration of the above discussion concerning the imperfect obligation, inherent

Id. at 242

Id. at 250

Ian Hurd, "Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World" 25 E. Int'l A. 298 (2011)

Bellamy, "A Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq" 19 (2) EIA 40 (September 2005)

Id. at 43

Id. at 53

Stahn, C., "Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?" 101(1) The American Journal of International Law 118 (Jan, 2007)

Bellamy, A., Responsibility to Protect 98 (Cambridge Polity Press, 2009)

Id. at 131

Id. at 99

Id. at 100

Id. at 198

Supra note 12 at 321.

Neil Macfarlane, Jennifer Welsh and CarolinTheilking, "The Responsibility to Protect – Assessing the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty", 57 Int'l J. 492 (2001–2002)

Neil Macfarlane, Jennifer Welsh and CarolinTheilking, "The Responsibility to Protect – Assessing the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty", 57 Int'l J. 489 (2001–2002), p- 493.

Supra note 12 at 322.

Supra note 71.

Ibid.

within the two frameworks, highlights how they are different when it comes to justifying inaction. This difference originates from the possibility states may be politically and economically unwilling to intervene even in the face of obvious humanitarian crises. The arguments underpinning the R2P doctrine and the agreements made in the 2005 World Summit Outcome offer states avenues in which to morally justify their unwillingness to intervene. Parallel to Hurd's argument that international law operates as a resource rather than a codified set of rules and regulations, states are able to pick and choose elements of the R2P doctrine in order to vindicate their policy of either inaction or action in a given humanitarian crisis. Under the R2P framework, it is ultimately the state in question's responsibility to provide a safe environment for its citizens conducive to domestic and international peace; the possibility of any form of intervention is always viewed as a last resort. Bellamy argues the situation which unfolded in Darfur in the early to mid-2000s was a textbook case where the R2P doctrine should have been invoked to intervene in the region. Reports of mass rape and slaughter of civilians in the region by government armed bandits, the Janjaweed, should have been a clear cut case where the Sudanese authorities failure to secure its citizenry's safety should have resulted in third-party military intervention. However, international commitments under the R2P doctrine have enabled anti-interventionists to avoid taking action by citing the primary responsibility of the state to provide domestic security.

Bellamy documents how UN resolution 1556, which threatened the Sudanese government with sanctions if it did not take positive steps to disarm the Janjaweed and punish human rights abusers within thirty days, was not only a contentious decision within the general assembly, but also highlighted the contradictory application of the R2P doctrine. The resolution itself was evidence of the international community's recognition that the people of the Darfur region were vulnerable and in dire need of protecting. However, the threat of sanctions stemmed from the lack of consensus on who should bear the responsibility. Despite key Western states recognising the Sudanese government was either unable or unwilling to protect civilians in the region, other states, such as Pakistan and China, who felt the threat of sanctions was too much, expressed the importance of non-interference of Sudanese sovereignty. Furthermore, the U.S. formally acknowledged that genocide had taken place in Darfur but refrained from publicly condemning the Sudanese government to avoid the responsibility to assume action. In a cruel irony therefore, for all the debates on abuse and misuse of R2P, Bellamy demonstrates that a hidden danger of the framework is its potential to be "abused by states keen to avoid assuming any responsibility for saving some of the world's most vulnerable people." Thus, where under traditional HI, a state's unwillingness to intervene in the face of surmountable evidence of atrocities is dependent upon that state's prerogative, R2P on the other hand differs because it can "*be used by different bodies to promote different goals*" by providing legitimate avenues in which to justify inaction.

Although Bellamy points out this negative difference between traditional HI and R2P, he also highlights the more positive difference that the latter framework offers a more robust structure to alleviate the possibility states have to choose between military action and doing nothing at all. By focusing on the preventative aspect of the R2P, Bellamy argues the framework offers an avenue to reduce "the frequency with which world leaders are confronted with a choice between 'sending in the Marines' and standing aside in the face of humanitarian emergencies."

Given the spectrum of factors to be considered to prevent the possible unfolding of atrocities, advocates of conflict prevention constantly have to point out its economic benefits, as opposed to

reaction, to justify their position. Bellamy attempts to strengthen the position of prevention advocates by refining this broad spectrum to factors related specifically to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The purpose of this refining is to address state concerns regarding the limits of conflict prevention. This applies both to states which are most likely to be required to act, and those states likely to be on the receiving end of preventative measures.

For those states which may possibly be required to act, drawing discernible limits to conflict prevention addresses their unwillingness to “commit themselves publically to additional costs without tangible benefits.” On the other hand, setting discernible limits also addresses state concerns a larger spectrum of conflict prevention measures may be utilised as a pretence to encroach on their sovereignty. These preventative measures therefore, central to R2P, are one of the main reasons the framework should be distinguished from traditional HI. For the overall aim of the R2P framework is “to reduce the frequency with which the protection of civilians from genocide and mass atrocities is dependent on the use of non-consensual force by outsiders,” characteristic of HI.

5.3. Rights v. Responsibility: Jurisprudential Aspects

Wesley Hohfeld, a Harvard law professor in the early part of the 20th Century, developed an analytical framework for understanding concept of Right. Hohfeld's eight terms are arranged in two tables of 'correlatives' and 'opposites' that structure the internal relationships among the different fundamental rights.

"Correlatives" signifies that these interests exist on opposing sides of a pair of persons involved in a legal relationship. If someone has a right, it exists with respect to someone else who has a duty. If someone has a privilege, it exists with respect to someone else who has no-right. If someone has a power, it exists with respect to someone else who has a liability. If someone has an immunity, it exists with respect to someone else who has a disability.

Many times, it is argued in favour that humanitarian intervention were based on a 'right to intervene' which was also based on the idea of the sovereignty of the individual. This approach used the rhetoric of the protection of human rights to make flexible the concepts of state sovereignty and non-intervention, thereby allowing states to intervene in other states due to humanitarian crisis. It granted them not only permission but also a right to do so.

In this aspect, the main points of the R2P are the proposed rhetorical shifts in the arguments on humanitarian intervention like changing sovereignty from an absolute right to a limited right and changing the 'right to intervene' to a 'responsibility to protect' and the establishment of criteria for action.

In relation to the rhetorical shifts, the R2P has been applauded for “*the conceptual move from a 'right to intervene' to a 'responsibility to protect' ”*, which could be a solution between sovereignty and human rights clash since sovereignty would be “*no longer conceived as undisputed control over territory, but rather as a conditional right dependent upon respect for a minimum standard of human rights*”.

However, these shifts may not be considered as the model solution since they are appeared at first glance the 'right to intervene' that was never helped to put states on guard against the incorporation of any formal doctrine of humanitarian intervention and never agreed in international law and relations. Due to this reason, the proposed is seen as a change from 'right' to 'duty' to intervene as the responsibility in practice means duty.

On the one side, the change of a right to a duty could be seen to achieve more encumbers in the action of the states than they are willing to do, which could be aside of the doctrine. It is the matter of fact that once it comes to the states as a 'right', there might be an option about practicing the said right or not. However, there is no such discretion to the states when it comes under a 'duty' because it obligates to carry out the action. In this sense, the responsibility of the national states appears to be adequately enclosed in the concept. However, the international obligation to exercise may endanger the doctrine in so far since the change could mean that the lack of express authorization by the UN Charter could be read in a more radical way than the above mentioned interpretations laid down by states, since it could mean an obligation to conduct humanitarian interventions.

On the other side, the shift would impose the need to establish a mechanism of assessing the responsibility in the event of failure of performing the duty. In the current manner of the international legal system, this would "mean a major transformation in so far as according to the ICISS the organ vested with the primary R2P is the Security Council, an organ against which judicial review has been very limited". In this sense, incorporating the proposed shift, the R2P may create new questions of legitimacy and legality rather than solving the existing issues on humanitarian intervention.

6. CONCLUSION

HI stems from a conception that states have a 'right' to intervene when sovereign states purposefully commit atrocities against their subjects. It is the threat or use of military force by state A on state B, when the latter fails to create a safe environment, conducive to peace and security for its citizens and the international community. Characteristically, the term 'intervention' is used to denote the intervening of state A in the internal affairs of state B under the pretence of securing human security.

R2P on the other hand is a more encompassing and holistic philosophy in that it proposes to go beyond mere intervention, and aims to limit the possibility of grave humanitarian crises arising through a process of prevention. By addressing underlining social issues, such as economic disparities, or religious sectarianism, before they escalate into an outright humanitarian crisis, proponents argue the R2P doctrine aims to prevent other Rwandas from occurring in the future. Though the concept does entail a possible use of military force in 'last resort' situations, proponents adamantly maintain the doctrine goes further than traditional HI by assisting in capacity building capabilities.

When comparing and contrasting debates within HI and R2P, from a third-world perspective, the minimal difference between the two frameworks is striking. The debates in both frameworks struggle to overcome the same moral and legal dilemmas. Within the R2P doctrine, this is more problematic since the main architects behind the doctrine attempted to distance it from traditional HI through a number of conceptual differences, the most central being the notion of conflict prevention. However, concerning the question of non-interference in another state's sovereignty under article 2 (4) of the UN charter, R2P runs into the same legal and moral issues as HI. The former doctrine's proposal to intervene without Security Council authorisation especially serves to heighten third world apprehension. In addition, the debates which seek to explain the application of both frameworks also parallel each other in their inability to reassure third world states' suspicions that either may be abused or misused by global powers. Events in Iraq and the lack of action taken against Israel for its refusal to act in accordance with UN resolutions with

regards to Gaza, serve only to engrain the third world perception there is little conceptual difference between the two frameworks. Finally, Glanville's observation that R2P is unable to adequately address the same dilemma of the 'imperfect obligation' that Stowell wrestled with in the early part of the 20th century, further demonstrates how the notion of military intervention in the framework has progressed little from HI.

The negative connotations attached to R2P due to these parallels with HI debates are compounded when considering a key difference with the former framework is its ability to be utilised to justify inaction. Whereas HI can be characterised as a black and white scenario where a state decides not to intervene because it is politically unwilling to do so, the R2P doctrine's theoretical language may be utilised to legitimize inaction. On the other hand, Bellamy points out the positive difference which distinguishes it from HI; its focus on conflict prevention significantly reduces the prospect states may have to choose between the two extremes of doing nothing or intervening militarily.

R2P was developed in order to prevent future abuses by states, either by action or non- action, of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. However, owing to the ever-changing scope of R2P, and the ambiguity of its third pillar, it is not clear what R2P really means and whether it is merely a rhetorical tactic or a fresh concept which would ultimately allow the imposition of sanctions on states who fail to fulfil their third pillar duties. Taking into account the current trend, which almost ignores the third pillar; it seems impossible to consider R2P as a fresh concept at present. Hence, we cannot agree, for the time being, that R2P's 'biggest innovations involve changing the paradigm of civilian protection from a right to a responsibility, and legitimizing the use of force as a last resort'. Against this background, it may be considered that R2P does not represent a major departure from humanitarian intervention. Taking into account its current scope, it might rather be classified as an imitation of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

RURAL POVERTY AND CONSUMPTION OF COOKING FUEL: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

Ravindra Sah* Vandana Ahirwar**

ABSTRACT

Increasing poverty has been accepted as a serious challenge for growth and development of an economy. India is having almost more than 21.9 percent of people, who are living below poverty line. Due to poverty, India is facing problems at every stage i.e. crime is increasing, people are dying due to diseases and infection such as cancer, bronchitis, COPD etc. Similarly poor people are living unhygienic life, and are eating from garbage, they sleep on road etc. And are cooking food from fire wood and related wastages of agriculture etc. which also causes cancer like disease in them etc. which are also harmful for environment as well as for human life to survive sustainably. Present study will focus on structure of cooking fuel among rural people. The methodology of the study will be to analyze on descriptive grounds and other essential econometric models. Data has been collected from NSSO rounds and planning commission.

Keywords : Poverty, Rural, Cooking fuel, Diseases

INTRODUCTION

Poverty remains predominant in rural India, three out of every four poor persons live in rural areas. Changes in urban and rural poverty followed a similar path over most of the last 25 years, with progress actually more rapid in rural India through the seventies and eighties. By 1990, urban and rural poverty rates had nearly converged; an unusual pattern compared to other South Asian countries. In the early 1990s, poverty rose faster in the rural than the urban areas, and then did not decline as rapidly (World Bank, 2000). The relationship between energy and poverty has preoccupied development specialists for decades. Running modern economies without energy is impossible; thus it has been argued that energy used, particularly such modern energy as electricity, is related in some way to economic development (Besant-Jones 2006; UNDP 2005)

The objective of my major concern is to deepen our understanding of energy utilization as one factor that underpins both economic development and poverty reduction by analyzing the relationship between energy and poverty in India.

The definition of poverty has evolved over the years from being a measure of income to a much more comprehensive measure of deprivations of many kinds such as health, education, income, energy and so on. The concept of energy poverty has been increasingly debated in recent years (IEA, 2002).


Air pollution is one of the major causes of premature death in developed and developing countries at present time. Indoor air pollution is a silent killer which has resulted in premature death of 1.24 lakh people in India according to the Lancet (2015). The biggest reason of indoor air pollution is the firewood and chips, cow-dung, coke, coal, agriculture waste that is burned as cooking fuel in the rural areas. Access to clean energy plays an important role to achieve the social goal. Traditional cooking

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fuel are responsible to serious risk to health and women empowerment. 819 million people in India use traditional fuel cook stoves for their cooking needs, according to the world energy outlook (2016). **Figure 1, shows the classic “energy ladder,” which defines changes in fuel consumption at different levels of economic development (Holdren and Smith, 2000). Households at lower levels of income and development tend to be at the bottom of the energy ladder, using fuel that is low-priced and locally available but not very clean nor efficient.** According to the WHO, over three billion people worldwide are at these lower stages, depending on biomass fuels—agriculture residues, dung cake, firewood, leaves, etc. and coal to meet their energy needs. An inconsistent number of these persons reside in Asia and Africa: 95% of the population in Afghanistan uses these fuels, 95% in Chad, 87% in Ghana, 82% in India, 80% in China, and so forth. Coal is seen as an advanced quality fuel due to its efficiency and storage, and thus is higher on the energy ladder, but as Holdren and Smith (2000) describe, coal can in fact be dirtier than wood. As incomes rise, we would expect that households would substitute to higher quality fuel choices.

The Energy Ladder



REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Using unclean fuels affects women health. It also decreases nutrition level of women. Author appeals that innovative techniques in cooking pattern should be adopted (Batliwala, S. 1983). The paper attempts to tell that the children less than five year and women are more affected by burning of biofuels. They recommended that petroleum policy should be redesign and kerosene oil should be provided at affordable price to the people, so that they will not depend on forest and it would have

good impact on women health (Parikh, J et al, 1999). To examine in his paper an indoor air pollution and impact on health of rural women of Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himanchal Pradesh. To full fill the objective of the study author have taken comprehensive data on socio- economics variable and smoking habit etc. finding of the study there is a need for creating awareness about use of clean fuels and ventilation in kitchen (Parikh J et al 2003). In this paper examine the use and access of energy and how it links with poverty. There are two approaches to measure the energy poverty. First approach is based on fuel poverty line in which they compute the average energy consumption of households at a certain term and condition. Second approach is based on engineering type calculation for basic needs of households. Then an alternative approaches define that how households access to clean and efficient energy sources the quality consume by the households is an important measurement of poverty (Pachauri, S and Spreng, D 2004). Author focus in his study on the expenditure clean and dirty fuels in total cooking fuels the objective of the study is to consider the main determinants of fuel choice in rural and urban areas. Household's level data from NSS during 1983-2000 are used in this study. Author found wide disparity between rural and urban households (Visnathan, B and Kumar, K.S.K, 2005). The paper explain that the biofuel is still a major source of cooking in developing countries like India. In India indoor air pollution is major cause of disease burden. Income, policies and price of fuels are effected the choice of fuel. The main objective of this study is to examine the relationship of pollution, income for the period 1983-2000. The data cover both rural and urban areas it is unit level data taken from NSS. By using environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) the study found that there is a non-linear (non-Monotonic) relationship between income and pollution that means the as income increases the pollution decreases. This relationship is very helpful for policy making in large countries like India. It will be also helpful to reduce pollution level (Kumar, K.S.K, and Viswanathan. B. 2007). One more study found that using unclean fuels resulted indoor air pollution in rural areas in Odisha. Indoor air pollution is main reason of respiratory disease. In this paper author covers 2400 households which are using unclean fuels finding this paper is frequency of respiratory disease is very high. There is high correlation between using traditional stoves and having symptoms of respiratory illness. Poverty health preference and bargaining power of women are other possible factors of respiratory disease (Duflo, E et al, 2008). Focus in this paper senility of energy schemes for women. There are two major energy scheme namely integrated energy policy and national energy policy are not able to give recognition to women in access energy program. Two new energy policies which are implemented for women betterment that are Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojna and Saubhagya Scheme. These scheme need to improve energy security of women (Manjula, M 2019). In rural areas of India most of the energy used for cooking purpose. Demand of biofuel is highest for cooking in rural India. Using biofuels is harmful for women health. By this statement author wants to examine the determinants of cooking fuel in rural areas. NSS 61st round data is used in this study by using logistic regression model. The study found that the educated women of age 10-50 and them who are getting regular salary are using clean fuel but they who are below poverty line specially reserve category family size and form size negative linkage.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

To examine the relationship between rural poverty and consumption of cooking energy.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This study is based on secondary data sources. We have taken data from the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), 50th, 55th, 61st, 66th and 68th (1993-2012) rounds have been utilized. We have taken poverty data from the Planning Commission. In this paper, we have measured the

correlation between rural poverty and consumption of cooking fuels has been estimated.

Table: 1 Correlation between Rural Poverty and Cooking & Lighting Energy in Rural India

Primary source of Cooking energy in rural India		
	<i>Poverty</i>	<i>firewood & Chips</i>
Poverty	1	
firewood & Chips	0.676554148	1
	<i>Poverty</i>	<i>LPG</i>
Poverty	1	
LPG	-0.659506316	1
	<i>poverty</i>	<i>Dung Cake</i>
Poverty	1	
Dung Cake	0.270959409	1
	<i>poverty</i>	<i>Other source</i>
Poverty	1	
Others source	0.118603825	1
	<i>poverty</i>	<i>No cooking arrangement</i>
Poverty	1	
No cooking arrangement	-0.549575326	1
Lighting		
	<i>poverty</i>	<i>Kerosene</i>
Poverty	1	
Kerosene	0.696004973	1
	<i>poverty</i>	<i>Electricity</i>
Poverty	1	
Electricity	-0.691315126	1
	<i>poverty</i>	<i>Other source</i>
Poverty		1
OS	0.142251606	1

Source: estimated from NSSO data 50th 55th 61st 66th 68th rounds & planning commission

COOKING ENERGY SOURCE

Table 1 show the study of correlation between poverty and various sources of cooking energy reveal interesting observations. A positive correlation is observed between poverty and use of firewood and chips as cooking fuel. Use of dung cake and other sources is also found to be weakly positively correlated with poverty. It reveals that the poor households are still dependent on unclean cooking energy sources. Significantly negative correlation between poverty and the use of LPG suggests that the very few poor households use LPG. A negative correlation between means that the people who are poor and are not having no cooking arrangements are insignificant.

LIGHTING

Study of correlation between sources of lighting and poverty shows a positive correlation between use of kerosene for lighting purpose and poverty, reflecting that the poor households use more and more of kerosene for lighting purpose. Use of electricity for lighting is found to be negatively correlated with poverty, suggesting that it is well earning households who have access to electricity.

CONCLUSION AND FINDING

In this paper major finding relating to primary source of energy used for cooking and lighting base on each rounds (50th, 55th 61st 66th 68th). It is found that household energy consumption levels and fuels used are closely related to variables such as availability, Income, occupation and household size. Majority of the households are using dirty fuel consumption for cooking purposes in the rural areas. The above findings clearly reflect that the poor households still have very little access to modern clean energy sources. People are shifted towards clean fuel but this percentage is very low in order to obtain the sustainable economy with sustained environment where as after globalization there is a shift in usage of qualitative fuel.

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BETTER WORK, BETTER LIVES FOR WOMEN: HOW A NETWORK OF PARTNERS CAN IMPROVE WORK CONDITIONS

By Wendy Olsen

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
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1. INTRODUCTION

The problems facing women in Uttar Pradesh and other north central Indian states are numerous, as identified by politicians. For example some claim that India can achieve defecation-free, zero-tolerance zones where toilet facilities will be suitable for all... and this if achieved would help women in great measure. In transport, too, women are harassed sometimes by men while reporting such incidents is relatively difficult; and this makes the use of transport and public places by women very challenging. The net result is a well-documented 'gender pay gap' in India, with women earning less than men even in comparable work.

The problems facing women are also shared by men – and are not unique to 'women who work for pay' - because all people are affected when women come down with depression or tension. Kabeer (2016) shows that women's issues affect everyone. Figure 1 illustrates that women's problems are made worse when their socio-economic position is bad. It is a form of suffering, an ill-being, and ultimately a damage done to women if their poor-quality living conditions, and the tension, oppression and conflict they face, cause them mental illness. In Figure 1, mental problems include a variety of conditions including sleeplessness, chronic fatigue, a state of confusion, anxiety, depression and stress.

Figure 1: Low Standard of Living Contributes to Depression Likelihood Among Women (India, 1998-2003)



Source: Shidhaye and Patel, 2010, Table 2. Their source is the National Family and Health Survey 2003. Key: "mental disorder" was deemed to occur if 5 or more of the General Health Questionnaire answers were positive. It thus reflects any mixture of stress, anxiety, depression, sleeplessness or confusion. Low, middle and high refer to the household's living standards and the baseline sample is a random sample across all of India.


Two strategic decisions were made by Shidhaye and Patel (2010), my source for Figure 1. They did cognitive interviews which convinced them that using the General Health Questionnaire was adequate. This GHQ survey is embedded in the National Family and Health Survey for India. With huge numbers of rural residents, most without formal jobs, it might be expected that the questions about anxiety or stress might not fit the context. They satisfied themselves that the questions do fit (Patel, Araya and Chowdhary, et al., 2008). The team cut across disciplinary boundaries in seeking possible ways in which economic or social mechanisms had contributed to mental suffering. One may question whether a mental disorder is in fact a form of mental suffering. Many people are living day-to-day with their mental problems. The GHQ reveals problems even if people tend to hide their problems through desirability bias, or to consider them 'normal'.

In identifying how the standard of living matters, Figure 1 shows it is very important. The odds of mental problems are halved for those in the 'high' socio-economic group. The middle group also has lower odds than the odds faced by the lowest group. (Here, presented as 1:1 odds.)

Probabilities run from 0 to 1, but "Odds" and "Odds ratios" can run from 0 to large numbers such as infinite.

The odds of a woman having a mental disorder in 2003 in India were 1 to 8. Overall, 11% of women had one that year. The odds ratio takes this idea a step further (Figures 1 and 2). The odds ratio here is a measure of how probable having a mental disorder is compared with not, given a condition on the horizontal axis, which I'll call condition 2. The odds ratio shown is the odds of CMD given that condition 2 is present. If we have 50:50 odds of condition 2, we might expect 50:50 odds of event 1, but this is often not the case. The ratio of the two odds gives us the measure found in the vertical axis of each graph in Figures 1-2.

Figure 2: Four Factors Contributing to Depression and Other Mental Disorders in Women



Source: Shidhaye and Patel, 2010,

Table 2. Coverage is India, 1998-2003. Key: Same as in Figure 1.

Their source is the National Family and Health Survey 2003. 6

In Figure 2, the odds of having mental disorders is higher if the husband is not satisfied with their dowry. Figure 2 also shows that the odds are higher if he has beaten her more than once, and/or if he drinks alcohol.

Overall the national, international, and local policy experts do see women's well-being as a considerable problem. Figures like these reveal issues that women face day-to-day.

2 POLICY AND STAKEHOLDER ACTION

It is possible to list the kinds of Actors who can change the world. Each 'actor' might be a person, a school, a Panchayat or other form of collective unit. Every organisation is potentially a force for good, an actor, and we use the word 'agency' to mean any actor that potentially can improve things or carry out changes. For better or worse, a wide range of actors are changing the Indian scene as it faces women: they respond to problems, in an ongoing way, taking decisions that matter. Actors, agents, collective agency, and mechanisms of change all work within set social contexts. Thus, it's possible to have a theory of change, which in a simple way can identify which kinds of actors or stakeholders do demand change from OTHER actors and from THEMSELVES.

I would stress, therefore, that the people who would improve the world for women are not only women. This important point assumes people are thoughtful, kind, politically active and engaged. It is both men and women, and collective agents, that can change the world. What happens is a series of steps, with people engaged in discussion, then reflexive action, and ultimately strategic action. We could define 'reflexive action' as acts based upon careful reflection about the social conditions and women's problems. We could define 'strategic action' as acts based upon discussion and choices made with the express intent of changing certain outcomes. The sum of all these actors' actions, along with the discussion and some evaluation and feedback loops, is known as 'development' for and with women. Thus, instead of focusing on Gross Domestic Income, we focus on the well-being of women and men, and we target strategic careful actions at improving well-being and reducing suffering (World Bank, 2010).

Moving to very simple terms that can be discussed in any local group, we can ask these questions:

--- Who is free to go out to pay a visit to others?

--- Are women jobless or not? 7

--- Who decides on making a purchase of a vehicle?

--- Are women doing too much work?

And we may soon reach these concrete problems:

--- Women are not free to decide when/where to go out, because men in Uttar Pradesh are more likely to be driving/walking them to their destination, thus they are not the decision makers about going out on a visit.

--- Women's jobs are usually considered as 'helper' in a household business, farm or with livestock. This common situation causes women's paid-work-related needs to be ignored (Rodgers, 2012). They do not get paid in money at all.

--- Most women in Uttar Pradesh do not drive, use or ride a vehicle. Transport is mainly dominated by men, and women must ask or request a ride, or pay for one. As a result they cannot go alone, or must walk if they go alone. Going to do paid work is thus fraught with complexity.

— Women also work long hours, if we take into account their double burden. They do 6 to 10 hours of domestic work per day plus any other work. This takes its toll by reducing the time available for leisure, friendships, rest, and taking care of her own health.

3 A PREVIOUS RURAL STUDY SHOWED GENDER NORM DILEMMAS

We conducted a study from 2014-2017 which showed Uttar Pradesh, and to some extent western Bihar and northern west Jharkhand, to have gender norms in common. This study showed that for many women, women's own values are a barrier to equality. Both the woman herself and her mother-in-law may hold very traditional values about how a household should allocate its work. Women and men rarely disagree about gender norms, in this region. (More generally, norms are the values that are widely shared; see Pearse and Connell, 2016.) Yet households disagree with each other. There are some households where both husband and wife believe that women should experience equality and fairness. In others, however, this is considered a ridiculous idea because it is not practically experienced; our study however was mainly based in rural areas. As shown by Harriss-White (2004), a widely-shared norm can be shared across social classes, even when the economic conditions of the classes are very different.

Many women are in fact withdrawn from the actual labour market when they have children, or when household income rises with migrants' incomes (Neetha, 2014; Rahul Lahoti and Swaminathan, 8

2015; Dubey, Sen and Olsen, 2017). This withdrawal has been associated with women having slightly more education than 'none', eg. Primary complete or secondary partial (Olsen and Mehta, 2006).

In urban areas the attitudes and norms are very diverse. We therefore define these terms carefully. First, Norms is the term we use to refer to shared group culture. Norms can be held within a caste group, a social class group, or a regional group of people. Eastern Uttar Pradesh has norms similar to rural western Uttar Pradesh but very different from urban Delhi for example. Second, the term "Attitudes" is one we use to refer to personal cultural practices. Views of individuals often coincide with the person's own group's norms. Therefore, practices actually often coincide with the group's norms. However there is diversity. In particular, there are rural/urban differences of gender norms. When one person migrates, their own attitude may change; or they may stay traditional but their left-behind female partner may change her own attitudes.

I can give three examples which our rich fieldwork supports in Uttar Pradesh.

First: A widow who is the female head of her own household, not having a Son or Uncle looking after her, often has a problem of attitude not coinciding with her own practices. She goes out for paid work. She feels forced to do it by her great need. She has traditional norms, and would prefer a man to look after her. Yet when she works, she discovers the independence that arises from controlling her income. Her money is precious to her. She therefore both appreciates the value of working, and yet disapproves of her paid work. Others also disapprove of her quite routinely.

Second: Another example is an elder couple over age 60, who have no children living with them. The adult children have left, moved away, and occasionally visit. Yet this couple is assetless, and after a long day's work, they go to bed hungry.

Third: A woman who is in a middle or higher caste Hindu household may look after cows and chickens. She may enjoy the work but have mixed feelings about it. Again, in Uttar Pradesh (rural western villages), we found that She has traditional norms, and would prefer a man to look after her. Yet when she works, she discovers the richness of controlling her cow, visiting the fields to graze and water the cow, getting out of the house frequently. Her work is valued by her family. Yet it is not

precious to her. Instead, she expresses to us her high disapproval of what outdoor work she does. She disapproves of her paid work. It is beneath her dignity. She also disapproves of her husband for not earning enough money to keep her well. She would prefer to be a housewife. 9

These three examples are stylised and yet are based on actual interviews. I will now turn to what problems we can identify more generally.

4 PROBLEMS IN THE SOCIETY ARE DILEMMAS ABOUT GENDER

Problem 1.

Table 1 shows that the gender role stereotypes are strong in Uttar Pradesh. The table shows both the 'principal' and 'subsidiary' – ie main and extra – occupations that were attributed to women. In our questioning, women are usually called housewife first. But secondarily they also do a lot of farming work. Only a few do any other occupation.

Here for example just 11 out of 205 were manual labourers as secondary to their housewife role, and just 7 manual labourers as a principal role. Many other preferred occupations were named: own-account worker, which means a trader or business person, for example. These have higher social status than manual labourer (kuulie). 10

Table 1: Occupations of Rural Women, East Uttar Pradesh

Occupation of Usual principal activity	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Self-employed (with employees)	1	0.49	0.49
Employed workers	6	2.93	3.41
Own account workers	9	4.39	7.80
Manual Labourers	7	3.41	11.22
Family worker	5	2.44	13.66
Housewife	175	85.37	99.02
Student	2	0.98	100.00
Total	205	100.00	

Occupation of Usual subsidiary activity	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	81	39.51	39.51
Self-employed (with employees)	2	0.98	40.49
Employed workers	3	1.46	41.95
Own account workers	7	3.41	45.37
Manual Labourers	11	5.37	50.73
Family worker	85	41.46	92.20
Housewife	15	7.32	99.51
Student	1	0.49	100.00
Total	205	100.00	

Source: six villages surveyed 2015/6.

Key: '0' means that no subsidiary occupation was stated. 11

Figure 3 illustrates a second major problem facing the Uttar Pradesh rural women. Their time is taken up with their double burden, yet at the same time their outdoor work particularly raises issues around potential harassment, violence if they walk outdoors at night, lack of toilet facilities, and perhaps also having to suppress their own voice to enable men to stand out as masterful. The masterful man was a

stereotypical, common image raised by both men and women in the interviews. People say that men 'tell women' what to do. But women typically 'help others'. 12

Figure 3: The Problems Facing Women 13



Table 2 illustrates a similar situation with regard to which industry women are allocated to. Most women are seen as working only in housewifery services (Table 2). Some are seen as agriculturalists, but mostly only in a subsidiary position. That is, women's main work is unpaid, while their remunerative work with livestock or crops is seen as secondary. The longterm durability of this social norm is stressed as the 'monotony' of patriarchy. The rule of men, as a gender, has some self-perpetuating facets. As a result we see over many generations a continuing rule of men, as a gender, over women. Of course there are exceptions but this is a social norm in Uttar Pradesh. 14

Table 2: Industrial Location of the Work Women Do, East Uttar Pradesh

Industry of Usual principal activity	Freq.	Percent
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	18	8.78
Construction	1	0.49
Accommodation and Food service	2	0.98
Education	2	0.98
Social work and health	4	1.95
Other service activities (e.g. barber)	178	86.83
Total	205	100.00

Industry of Usual subsidiary activity	Freq.	Percent
0	80	39.02
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	88	42.93
Manufacturing (e.g. pottery, beedi)	2	0.98
Wholesale, retail trade; repair activities	5	2.44
Education	3	1.46
Other service activities (e.g. barber)	27	13.17
Total	205	100.00

^{F1}
Key: '0' means that no subsidiary industrial location was stated.

Source: six villages surveyed 2015/6. 15

Table 3 illustrates a third problem facing women: the double-burden itself takes up so much of their time. Their total work hours are over 10 hours per day, no matter which social class they are in. Figures 4-5 illustrate that there are huge sex differences in work hours but very low differences (comparatively) across social classes. 16

Table 3: Working-Time by Sex, East Uttar Pradesh Rural

Village	Women Work Time (Minutes per Day) 2015/6)				
	Domestic	Animals	Farming	OtherWork	PaidWork
1	369	71	79	17	167
2	443	27	25	20	73
3	354	47	82	23	152
4	378	80	67	12	159
5	354	77	87	15	179
6	356	59	92	3	154

Source: six villages surveyed 2015/6. 17 18

5 SOLUTIONS

Obviously, if women are experiencing conflicts over roles, low pay in paid work, mental suffering and risks of harassment, then social actors should do something about it. We set out to discuss with key social actors what kinds of actions might help to improve the situation.

First it is useful to consider, who are the stakeholders? Why do these agents want to change India to make it better for women? We found plenty of active interest among a variety of professionals. Staff in businesses, NGOs, schools and hospitals all share a strong interest in improving women's lives. As they do so, their own situation also improves and so does the situation for household members of the women. However, it is not so easy. One must have a programme of strategic action.

We also found that workers themselves are keen to discuss the conflicts and contradictions. In interviews, women sometimes expressed frustration. It is difficult to reconcile women's desire to work in public places with the social expectations. It is useful to consider a wider range of stakeholders – not only professionals. It has already been discovered, through practical lessons of history, that if you leave social planning to elites and professionals, women will remain oppressed.

In general then, we may look for a wider social strategic action plan. This could be called a 'Charter'. A Charter is like a manifesto, a list of demands, or a strategic action plan. A Charter would need not only to list the vision, but also the actions that might produce that vision. If the vision is equality, what would create equality?

India has a rich and vibrant women's movement. I can summarise some aspects of it. The Indian women's movement has many kinds of actors, including political parties' women's wings; feminist groups; action groups for women such as Pink Brigades; trade union women's wings; staff associations which represent women in key occupations; the Self-Employed Women's union SEWA;

and individual women.

Further actors, who are important for progress on women's questions include the Officials in the public sector and in local government. Hospital Employees, engineers, nurses, cleaners, farmers, traders, and workers all need to be brought together. This becomes a social movement.

By offering Figure 7, I suggest that it is not enough to have a vision. It is crucial to also develop a list of concrete actions. Putting these into a project-and-programme framework over time involves checking up on our progress. This is quite common in organisations. For the women's movement we also need to do it across the whole social movement, ie in public.

Figure 7: A Vision For Women; and a Charter With/For/About Women

Goals: Women's health Decent work for women Children and young women well-being	Charter: Identifies the actors and not just the vision: Panchayat member , support sanitation actions! School head , encourage reporting of abuse! Nurses , support victims reporting any incident!
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Table 5: Women's Work-Time in Different Main Work Categories, 3 States of India

		Indian Time-Use by Social Class (Rural, States)					
	Household Social Class	Domestic	Animals	Farming	Other Work	Paid Work	TOTAL MINUTES/DAY
Females	Capitalist	460	19	27	26	72	532
	Petit bourgeois	405	48	59	14	121	526
	Wage labour	409	41	65	11	117	526
Males	Capitalist	89	57	29	90	177	266
	Petit bourgeois	86	52	60	59	171	258
	Wage labour	84	39	59	61	160	243

Source: fifteen villages surveyed 2015/6.

6 CONCLUSIONS : Who Can Act? Whose Strategic Actions Matter?

In our research we try to discover which strategic action plans work well. We encourage social actors to enunciate their plans, state their visions, work out how to get there, and when where and why to act. We encourage that instead of thinking only of waiting for others, or taking personal action, people consider how we can act together with mutual support. In history, acting together in concert – known as 'Collective Action', -- has proved more successful than personal action alone.

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INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE WORKSHOP / SEMINAR ON 'WOMEN'S WORLD OF WORK: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES '

Brief Report and Conclusion

Dr. Anup Kumar Mishra*

This collaborative international workshop on “ Women world of work : Issues and challenges” was jointly organized on 7th June 2019 by the **Department of Economics, DAV PG College and School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, U.K.** for Better Work, Better Lives for Women. The motive of the workshop was to create a Network of partners to improve the work condition.

The core Team Members were Wendy Olsen, Professor of Socio-Economics in the department of social Statistics, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, Prof. Amaresh Dubey, Professor of Economics, Centre for the Study of Regional Development (CSRD), JNU Delhi , Dr. Anup K. Mishra, Associate Prof. of Economics, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi and Dr. Purva Yadav, Assistant Prof. of Geography, Centre for the Study of Regional Development (CSRD), JNU Delhi

BACKGROUND OF THE WORKSHOP

Many problems face women in Uttar Pradesh and other north central Indian states. For example some claim that India can achieve defecation-free, zero-tolerance zones where toilet facilities will be suitable for all. If this was achieved it would help women very much. In transport, too, women are harassed sometimes by men while going to work by bus. Reporting such incidents is relatively difficult. This situation makes the use of transport and public places by women very challenging. The net result is a well-documented 'gender pay gap' in India, with women earning less than men even in comparable work. Some women simply decide not to do paid work outside the home. The problems facing women are also shared by men and they are not unique to 'women who work for pay'. That is because all people are affected when women come down with depression or tension. 1/8 of India's women had tension, depression, stress or sleeplessness in 2003. Strong gender role stereotyping occurs in Uttar Pradesh.

When asked for their 'principal' and 'subsidiary' – ie main and extra – occupations, women are usually called housewife first. But secondarily they also do a lot of farming work. Only a few do any other occupation. Manufacturing is almost entirely reserved for males. A second major problem facing the Uttar Pradesh women is their double burden of work. They do both domestic and paid work.

Time Worked by Women and Men In rural Uttar Pradesh, we carried out a time-use one-day diary survey. Women worked on average 9 hours a day, but men worked on average just 4 ½ hours a day. This was an average of two days in the year 2015/6. Domestic work took up 6 ½ hours a day for women, and 1 ½ hours a day for men.

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CONCLUSIONS

Who Can Act? Whose Strategic Actions Matter? In this project, we try to discover what are people's strategic action plans about women's work. We encourage social actors to make an action plan, state their visions, work out how to get there, and who should act. Instead of thinking only of taking personal action, or waiting for others, people can consider how we can act together with mutual support. In history, acting together in concert – known as 'Collective Action', -- has proved more successful than personal action alone. This project uses 'Community Research' to find out what collective actions are recommended.

PROJECT ABSTRACT

With the above background the workshop was initiated to evaluate the project to be taken with Funding from the Global Challenges Research Fund, Grant on “Charters for Better Work Better Lives: An Indian Partner Network”, Co-investigators Wendy Olsen, Amaresh Dubey and Punita Chowbey.

In poverty stricken parts of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, India, project aim to show that local civic society can address the urgent need to improve the lives of working women. This project enables a partnership to form across up to six cities to support a Charter movement. Each 'Charter' is a simple draft manifesto of advice on how to change the society to achieve 'Better Work, Better Lives'. Our Charter initiative - for which this is a pilot project - focuses mainly on gender. The project is a follow-up to research on gender norms and adults' time-use. A Charter network can grow an awareness of how to voice demands, naming specific change-agents, which are people and organisations (or post holders) who can help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) both in social and economic-political ways.

The main method used in this project is a narrow form of community research, which we have created, aiming to focus on public dialogue: The civic workshop. Here, we promote social development via reflection and group exercises in reflexivity and voice about women's work. This pilot project evolved out of the existing Win-Win Partnership for Women's Economic Empowerment (2013-present, an international email list of partners) and is now generating an India-based Better Work Better Lives (BWBL) network. The project thus hope to set the groundwork for a possible 2020 or 2021 Charter Congress. In August 2019 the BWBL Network research team conducts six Civic Workshops. By Nov. 2019, project team will create a larger international bid for funds. BWBL aims to have a social-media presence from 2019 to 2023. It is both multidisciplinary, and provides value for money.

CHARTER FRAMED AT DAV, VARANASI WORKSHOP

The particular full day workshop was very consultative and participatory in nature. Five groups were created with ten members each mixed of teaching, non teaching and other working women communities. One separate group was also created for the specific views of men participants.

After deep consultation and with equal sharing capacity finally the “**CHARTER**” was framed as follows:

Working men and women should evenly share domestic duties.

Equal participation of couples in decision making.

Gender stereotyping should be stopped.

Domestic work should be recognized as work.

Gender sensitivity should be included in the academic curriculum.

Men should be trained in gender sensitivity.

Proper sanitation at the workplace/schools.

Public transport should be safe and women-friendly.

Centre for Women's Development Studies can do mobile training for men and women.

REPORT
INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON “CHILD-LABOR: ISSUES & THE WAY FORWARD”

BY

Vimal Shankar Singh*

Department of Economics, DAVPG College, Varanasi in collaboration with Manchester University U.K. organized consultative International workshop on “Child-Labor: Issues & the Way Forward” in which participants mainly academicians from U.K., Spain, UNICEF, JNU, BHU, etc. along with NGOs and members of the district administration took part and deliberated intensively. The participants emphasized that there are several dimensions of the problems of child labor that varies from conceptual to operational and systematization of all facets connected to it. A comparison between national and international level Child labor problems revealed that there is little difference between them. The only difference lies between seize and enormity on the one hand and intensity and organized crime on the other. However, everyone was convinced that 'child' has little priority in our life. Nonetheless, consensus emerged that if any country wants to surge ahead economically and socially then it will have to accept and blossom children's as blossom hearts.

Prof. Amaresh Dubey of JNU said that statistics shows that child labor is on decline in India. The number of working children in age group of 5-14 years was 1.27 crore in 2001 which was 5 per cent of the total children in that group, where as in 2011, the child workers (1.01 cr.) constituted 4 per cent of the age group 5-14 years. This is a welcome feature; however, the fact that still we have more than 1 crore children's working as child labor is a blot on the face of the country. Prof. N.K. Mishra of BHU said that the more worry some aspect of this problem reflects in the fact that child labor among Schedule Tribes are highest in India. Hilly states of the country, such as, Nagaland, Himachal Pradesh and Sikkim are *saddled* more with this problem. Poverty, illiteracy, though, are important factors of child labor, however, the menace of ignorance among some low castes & poor population dithers them even to accept that they are doing something wrong with their own children.

Presiding the workshop Dr. Vimal Shankar Singh, Head, Department of Economics drew attention on a new dimension that has emerged recently in India that unlike previous years practice now entire family migrates from rural to urban areas. In this situation the family finds itself under the midst of purchasing power crunch that forces the entire family including all children to work and in that process the child convert itself from asset of the nation to asset of the family. Prevalence of child labor in mass is found in both rural areas as well as urban industries. District official relating to child welfare made astonishing revelations that in the process of rescuing children from different places, they often face acute pressure not only from top district administration but also from politicians, etc. Instances shows that even top Universities are besieged by this problem and their administration do not

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cooperate with them in preventing this. NGOs on the other hand find the rehabilitation work most problematic and challenging. Researchers view that data and information relating to child-labor are suppressed and curtailed.

Prof. Ser Huang Poon of Manchester University emphasized that there is dire need of data and information sharing for preventing world –wide phenomena of child labor. She stressed for use of machines i.e. use of Artificial Intelligence for collecting, storing and interpreting the data & information. She said that Block-chain can be developed at the bottom level and emerging information and data can be collected from grass-root and passed on to higher level. Collection of different data and information from horizontal levels world-wide and passing it vertically to country-level and finally at world level would store the information at the global level. This process will prevent suppression, curtailment and loss of data. Big-Data can also be of great use for collecting and interpreting the information. The countries can use and act upon this menace by using these emerging technologies. Dr. Anup Kumar Mishra welcomed the guests and initiated the program.
